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The United States Supreme Court's search and seizure
decisions have for decades prompted scholars to complain
about the Court's Fourth Amendmene interpretive "mess ...:~
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The text of the Fourth Amendment provides that
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These scholars have railed against the Court's inconsistent
approaches in deciding the constitutionality of investigatory
practices. Undoubtedly, the Court's decisions during the next
decade will continue to contain these multiple, conflicting
interpretive paths when applying the Fourth Amendment to
governmental officials' use of technology during investigations.
We can, however, stop chiding the Court for its
unpredictability by embracing postmodern perspectives,3

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or aftirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." I d.
2
Ronald B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment:
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973). Professor David Sklansk.y
in 1997 wrote of the "old mess" and the "new consensus" on the Court. David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 271, 291-92. He summarized well the scholarly
critique:
Complaints about the disarray of Fourth Amendment law have long been
a staple of legal scholarship. It has not been thirty-five years since Roger
Dworkin first called Fourth Amendment cases "a mess" and Anthony
Amsterdam said this was an understatement. Nearly two decades ago,
Silas Wasserstrom and Louis Michael Seidman found "virtual unanimity"
that "the Court simply bad made a mess .of search and seizure law."
More recently, Akhil Amar bas described Fourth Amendment law as
"jumble[d]," "contradictory," and-of course-a "mess." As Morgan Cloud bas
noted, "[c]ritics of the Supreme Court's contemporary Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence regularly complain that the Court's decisions are," among
other things, "illogical, inconsistent, . . . and theoretically incoherent."
ld. at 291-92 (citations omitted); see also Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48
DUKE L.J. 787, 787-88, 801 (1999) (referring to the Fourth Amendment "mess" and
stating that "each doctrine is more duct tape on the Amendment's frame and a
step closer to the junkyard"); David E. Steinberg, The Drive Toward Wa"antless
Auto Searches: Suggestions from a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L. REv. 545, 571
(2000) (citing a metaphor related to "mess"- the proverbial "tarbaby"). According to
Professor Craig M. Bradley, the Fourth Amendment is "the Supreme Court's
tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that bas ensnared the 'Brethren'
in such a way that every effort to extract themselves only finds them more
profoundly stuck." ld. (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1468 (1985)).
• For a discussion of postmodernism, see infra text accompanying notes 4-5,
8-12, 17-20, 23, 35-46, and 62-112. But see Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law,
Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 521,
522 (1992) (stating that criminal-law scholarship "bas not yet earned the right to
subject itself to postmodem critiques because it has not yet fully passed into or
through the modem phase").
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which help us understand why the Court has no constant
guiding principle or principles. Postmodernists would expect
multiple, conflicting constructions of the Fourth Amendment
because "interpretation" is merely a community construct. 4
Because multiple communities compose our society; (with

4

See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. LlTOWITl, POSTMODERNISM PHILoSOPHY AND LAW 11
(1997) (stating the postmodernists "argue that reason is not a uniform faculty in
all humankind but rather socially constructed; it is always situated within
existing practices and discourses, and it will therefore be biased or slanted in
favor of existing power relations"); J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern
Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966, 1972 (1992) [hereinafter Balkin,
Postmodern Constitutionalism] (stating that postmodem philosophy "view[s]
knowledge as an activity infused with social interaction and power rather than
merely a set of articulable propositions or truths"). Professor Angela Harris's
definition of postmodernism also rejected the notion of objective truth:
[Postmodernism] suggest[s] that what has been presented in our socialpolitical and our intellectual traditions as knowledge, truth, objectivity,
and reason are actually merely the effects of a particular form of social
power, the victory of a particular way of representing the world that then
presents itself as beyond mere interpretation, as truth itself.
Angela P. Harris, Foreward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv.
741, 748 (1994) (quoting Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob: The Politics of
Representation, 2 TIKKuN 28, 30 (July/Aug. 1987)); see also Scott L. Cummings &
Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv.
443, 452 (2001) (describing the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which
began in the late 1970s, as having as its "project" the revelation of "power
hierarchies embedded in liberal individual rights"; describing CLS writings as
"showing the indeterminacy of legal rules and the inherently political choices of
underlying the current legal order"); Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist
Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1 n.1 (2001) (using to postmodernism
"to designate the shift in theory from an approach that focuses on the search f()r
reality to an approach that focuses on culturally constructed social meanings"). See
generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 7-14 (1998)
(describing how the time in which we live shapes our lives and perspectives). But
see J. Gregory Sidak, Mr. Justice Nemo's Social Statics, 79 TEx. L. REv. 737, 739
(2001) (advocating that society should view law as an "evolutionary institution," one
seeking "objective knowledge"; under this view of law, "law's legitimacy arises from
objective knowledge that the particular legal rule at issue is superior to all other
known means of ordering a specific kind of relationship or transaction"). Mr. Sidak
also has criticized the Court and scholara for constructing doctrines and theories
that are "inherently nonfalsifiable." (stating that "(N]onfalsifiable rationales for
constitutional decisions tend to increase the size of the state, which derivatively
increases the power and prestige of the Supreme Court, the lower courts, and legal
clerisy in which law professors rank highly.").
• See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 232122 (1997) (describing American society as containing multiple "status groups,"
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scholars6 and the justices on the Court as examples of

which may arise because of "common styles of life and common senses of honor,
prestige, or moral rectitude" or because of "religious and ethnic identities);
Charles W. Collier, Law As Interpretation, 16 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 779, 817-23
(2000) (distinguishing between a community, which shares particular values, and
society, which has diverse, divergent values).
• Legal academic scholars represent numerous contrasting communities. For
example, Professors Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, who have described
themselves as centrists and pragmatists, wrote a book vehemently attacking
another academic community, one they labeled "radical multiculturalists" and
paranoid "extremists." DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL
REAsON: THE RADICAL AsSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICA 9, 11, 133 (1997)
(characterizing their own arguments as "harsh," but necessary because radical
multiculturalism has "serious, profound, and dangerous flaws"). Their vitriolic book
triggered academic salvos from other scholarly communities. See, e.g., Kathryn
Abrams, How to Have a Culture War, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 1091, 1092, 1126 (1998)
(arguing that Farber and Sherry heightened the "legal culture wars" and that
their "flawed and inflammatory critique moves us in precisely the wrong
direction"); John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior: A Critical
Response to the Hegemonic "'TruthD of Daniel Farber and Suzzana Sherry, 83
MINN. L. REv. 1589, 1590, 1609 (1999) (arguing that Farber and Sherry's "truth"
"operates to deny humanity to . . . people of color in the United States" and their
book is "an expression of cultural racism"); Anne M. Couglin, C'est Moi, 83 MINN.
L. REv. 1589, 1621, 1622 (1999) (noting the hostile tone of the book and faulting
the authors, "at least some of the time, for claiming that the political is the
truth"); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83
MINN. L. REv. 1637, 1640 (1999) (describing the book as a "diatribe" against
critical race theorists"); Nancy Levit, Critical of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit,
and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795, 808 (1999) (rejecting Farber and Sherry's view
that radical multiculturalists have implicitly attacked tenured Jewish lawyers and
professors, but stating that "[i]t is curious that two Jewish scholars understand
what is means to be a member of a minority ethnicity when it is their ethnicity
under attack-or perceived attack," and adding "that is the whole point of
perspectivism"); Francis J. Mootz, Ill, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming
Reason in American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 605, 606 (1998)
("By equating 'reason' with 'truth,' Farber and Sherry make a diagnostic error
that one might expect from the country doctors who embrace right-wing legal
ideologies but which is unforgivable for such talented and level-headed
practitioners"); Edward J. Rubin, Jews, Truth, and Critical Race Theory, 93 Nw.
U. L. REv. 525, 527 (1999) (rejecting their view that critical race theory casts
aspersions at Jewish scholars, but describing their anti-Semitic argument as a
"brilliant rhetorical move"). Some scholars, who would want to be called
"traditionalists," have condemned the innovative scholarship styles and
explorations of other scholars as reflecting the "Law Political Correctness (LPC)
ideology." See Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Review Articles,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 233, 235, 237-76 (1999) (denigrating authors in the
following order: Mary Jo Frug (number one pick for LPC), Patricia Williams,
Madeline Morris, Duncan Kennedy and Peter Gabel, Derrick Bell, Richard

2002]

"SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

451

numerous, contrasting communities), 7 we should anticipate
different constructions of the Fourth Amendment.
Even though postmodern philosophy rejects the idea of an
objective grand, unifying theory,8 the loss of an objective
constitutional interpretation should not dishearten us or make
us fear that nihilism is right around the corner,9 ready to
grab and rob us of vitality as members of the legal community

Delgado, Anthony D'Amato, Marie Ashe, Robin West, and Paul Butler); see also
RoBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 7
(1991) ("exagerat[ing) only a little, the law-and-economics scholars believe that the
law-and-society group is deficient in both sophistication and rigor, and the lawand-society scholars believe that the law-arid-economics theorists are not only out
of touch with reality but also short on humanity").
7
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law
and Politics, 110 YALE L. J. 1407, 1442-43 (2001). In analyzing the Bush v. Gore,
121 S. Ct. 525 (2000), Professor Balkin has described the Court's merging of
politics and decisionmaking:
[It) was the conservatives who were making the equal protection
argument and extending the Warren Court precedents; it was the liberals
who were urging deference to the states' legal processes . . . . The
conservatives used whatever arguments were available to promote George
W. Bush's election, while the liberals offered the arguments that would
have helped Al Gore. This is a more overt collapse of the boundary
between law and politics than Critical Legal Studies would normally
predict, although it is perhaps consistent with cruder forms of legal
realism.
Id. In addition, Professor Balkin has noted that an argument that seems "loony"
may become "positively thinkable" depending upon the status of the person making
the argument. Id. at 1444 (noting law relies heavily on "institutional authority").
8
See infra text accompanying notes 62-92.
9
See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1984):
[T)he absence of determinacy, objectivity, and neutrality does not condemn
us to indifference or arbitrariness, nor make it ridiculous to ask, or
impossible to answer, the question of what we should do or how we
should live. The lack of a rational foundation to legal reasoning does not
prevent us from developing passionate moral and political commitments.
On the contrary, it liberates us to embrace them.
ld.; see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 157-62 (1988). Professor
Levinson has described how Dean Paul Carrington of Duke Law School had argued
that legal nihilists "have an ethical duty to choose a career other than teaching
law." Id. at 157. Levinson responded with a question: "Does socializing the young,
including fledgling lawyers, into the central tenet of the faith-defmed by Lincoln as
'reverence for the law'-allow toleration within the schoolhouse of the 'civil atheist'?"
Id. at 162.
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and communities within society. 10 Instead postmodernism
perspectives allow us to see the "'language games' that arise
with respect to different spheres of social life, each incomplete
and constantly subject to alteration and development. "11 By
examining the language games the Court has used to
construct what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search," we
are better able see the numerous roads from which the Court
could have selected. 12

10

See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 6, at 638, 640 (describing that a "plurality of
discourses yields perspective and clarity," not "relativistic chaos of
incommensurate group identities").
11
Balkin, Postmodem Constitutionalism, see supra note 4, at 1972; see also
GUYORA BINDER & RoBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CruTICISMS OF LAW 122 (2000).
Professors Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg noted that philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein used the term "language games" to describe the uncertainty of
meaning in words, in contrast to Fernand de Saussure, who viewed language as a
"sign system" with "a discrete body of rules," which functioned in a system with
"a definite boundary." Id. They described Wittgenstein's view of language and
meaning:
Since meaning is use in his [Wittgenstein's] pragmatist scheme,
understanding a sign means competence in using it as discourse. Such
discourses do not have hard boundaries-the range of moves that may be
recognized as going on with a linguistic practice, as "within rules," cannot
be exhaustively specifled in advance and is contingent on the responses of
other participants in the game. There is no common feature, for example,
that all correct uses of a word must have. Correct uses are unified only
by a "family resemblance," a set of "overlapping" characteristics not
specifiable in advance.
Id. at 122-23. Professor Dennis Patterson has also used the term "language-game"
to describe discourse in postmodernism:
[T)he question "is this law valid?" has no point for the "knowledge"
required to answer the question is a knowledge that can never exist. In
postmodernity, legitimation of first-order discourses (e.g. law and science)
by resort to second-order discourses of reason (e.g. philosophy) is replaced
with a picture of knowledge as a move within a game, speciflcally a
"language game."
Dennis Patterson, Postmodemism/Feminism/Law 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 256 n.
9 (1992).
12
See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 6, at 638-39. Professor Mootz has described
critical legal theorists as seeking to reveal the inherent choices courts faces in
interpreting the law:
Much of the work by critical race theorists, radical feminist, and gay
legal scholars . . . seek to displace the conceit that law operates as a
rational enterprise, not by claim that law is hopelessly irrational, but by
demonstrating that law often requires a reasonable judgment as between
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In examining the Court's language games, this Article
describes rhetorical tools that the Court has used in deciding
cases. 13 Instead of despairing at the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudential "mess," this Article invites the reader to ask
what the "mess" tell us about policing in our society. 14 By
discerning the lack of clear, objective rules, we are able to
view legal doctrines, principles and interpretations as

two or more logically acceptable resolutions of any given issue. The
radical critique discloses connections between the seemingly "natural"
presuppositions of judgment by tracing them to constitutive social
processes that embody contingent and debatable beliefs about, inter alia,
race, gender, and sexual orientation.
I d.
13

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THOMAS D. RoWE, REBECCA L. BROWN, &
GIRARDEAU A SPANN, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 1
(2d ed. 2000) (stating that even though "widespread consensus does exist that the
constitutional text, history, structure, and precedent are valid sources for
constitutional advocacy and decisionmaking, deep divisions !have arisen) over their
use and their very nature"); J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction:
Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1994) (arguing that
"deconstructive argument is a species of rhetoric, which can be used for different
purposes depending upon the moral and political commitments of the
deconstructor"); Linda Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal
Truth, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 727, 754 (1999) (stating that judges ultimately have to
decide which rhetorical tool best fits a particular case: "slippery slope" argument,
"floodgates of litigation" argument, "plain language" argument, "deterrence"
argument, "counter-majoritarian" argument and "framer's intent" argument);
Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1377 (1995) ("In virtually all cases, the judge
shapes her raw material. She picks her rhetoric to foreshadow the result"); Robin
West, Constitutional Fictions and Meritocratic Success Stories, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 995, 995 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court "tells stories about our
collective past-our political and social history-to support the results for which it
argues"; adding that "those political and social histories are not simply true or
false: like stories of fact and precedent, such histories are a blend of fact and
falsehood").
1
'
Professor Laurence H. Tribe in 1988 raised a similar, but different, question
about the Supreme Court's wildly inconsistent state-action decisions. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1691 (2d ed. 1988). He stated that "it is
possible to construct an 'anti-doctrine,' an analytical framework which, in
explaining why various cases differ from one another, paradoxically provides a
structure for the solution of state action problems." Id. Professor Tribe
characterized this approach as "the way out of the forest is through the trees. •
Id. In contrast, this Article does not offer a structural solution to the "mess," but
rather views the inconsistencies under the Fourth Amendment as lenses to
examine the culture as seen by the Supreme Court justices.
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reflecting our society, the "small-'c' constitution," a ter,m
Professor David A. Strauss has used in discussing the
relationship between the written Constitution and its
interpretation. The "small-'c' constitution" refers to the
"fundamental institutions of a society, or the constitution in
practice. "15 For him, "the forces that bring about
constitutional change work their will almost irrespective of
whether and how the text of the Constitution is changed. "16
One leading postmodern scholar, Professor Jack Balkin,
has contended that the best way to use postmodern
perspectives is to ask the following question: "How have
changes in technology, communication, and the organization of
living and working changed the public's understanding and
practice of law, the Constitution, human rights and
democracy?" 17 His question has special significance when
police officers, lawyers, and judges question whether
governmental officials' use of new technology would violate the
Fourth Amendment, particularly after the tragic events of
September 11, 2001. Since adoption of the Fourth Amendment
in 1791, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
confronted the question of how to interpret the Fourth
Amendment in light of technological developments, but the
rapid growth of technology in our contemporary world
heightens our need to understand the Court's definition of

16

David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 IIARV.
L. REv. 1457, 1459-60 (2001).
18
Id. at 1458-59. Professor Strauss establishes the importance of current
society in interpreting the Constitution by examining four propositions:
First . . . sometimes matters addressed by the Constitution change even
though the text of the Constitution is unchanged. Second, . . . some
constitutional changes occur even though amendments that would have
brought about those very changes are explicitly rejected. Third, when
amendments are adopted, they often do no more than ratify changes that
have already taken place in society without help of an amendment. The
changes produce the amendment, rather than the other way around.
Fourth, when amendments are adopted even though society has not
changed, the amendments are systematically evaded. They end up having
little effect until society catches up with the ambitions of the amendment.
Id. at 1459. In short, society projects meaning (or no meaning) onto an
amendment; the text does not give us its meaning, but society does.
17
Balkin, Postmodern Constitutionalism, see supra note 4, at 1977.
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what constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
Postmodern constitutional law theory recognizes the
evolving nature of law. It helps us to see that Fourth
Amendment analysis is a product of our times. By considering
several themes of postmodernism, 18 we are able to view
justices' and scholars' offering constructions of the law rather
than "interpretations. "19 As one postmodernist has stated, the
"reigning mythology of American law and legal studies ...
typically frames law as if it were a priori subject to the
dictates of reason, intelligence and really good normative
arguments."20 The metaphor of "constructing" law as opposed
to "interpreting" law highlights communities' projecting their
meaning in text. 21 The perception of the Court's shifting
paradigms and inconsistencies may not only reflect our
particular communities' values, but also suggests changes in
our society or, in the context of this Article, particular changes
in technology. 22
Part I discusses postmodernism. It reveals that both

18

Professor Morgan Cloud has stated that "pragmatism commands that
decisionm.akers should not be bound by antecedent principles or rules; they should
make decisions grounded in social and physical realities." Morgan Cloud,
Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 199, 212 (1993). In contrast, postmodernists do not believe that "antecedent
principles and rules" actually constrain decisionmakers. In addition, under
Professor Cloud's characterization of pragmatism, this approach can be
"conservative" when "rooted in contextualism" because it "empowers instrumental
impulses." Id. at 211. In contrast, postmodernists believe that their view of
interpretation allows decisionmak.ers great latitude, affording liberal, conservative,
down-the-middle-of-the road constructions. See Stephen Feldman, The Supreme
Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REv. 673, 678-79
(2000).
19
See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARv. L. REv.
1047, 1102 n.198 (2002).
20 Id.
21
For a discussion of textual arguments, see infra text accompanying notes
87-90, 103-12.
22
See text accompanying infra notes 88-102; see also Christopher Slobogin,
Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules
Governing Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1393 (2000) (citing empirical studies to
challenge the Court's characterization enhanced home surveillance and its
perceived intrusiveness).
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conservatives and liberals may use the insights of
postmodernism to further their communities' agendas or
goals. 23 As many scholars have noted, the word "rhetoric"
itself is susceptible to different definitions 24-including the
"ignoble art of persuasion,"25 the enterprise of describing the
23

See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 18, at 678 (stating that "postmodernism is
politically ambivalent" and noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice
Scalia's "political conservatism does not prevent them from being
postmodernists."); Robert Justin Lipkin, Can American Constitutional Law Be
Postmodern? 42 BUFF. L. REv. 317, 325 n.18 (1994) (stating that "two general
approaches to postmodernity exist: a radical approach and a reconstructive
approach." The "radical approach seeks an abrupt break with modernity and
modem theories, while the reconstructive approaches uses both modem and
postmodem elements in their attempt to reconstruct critical social theory"); Peter
C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodernism Thought and Its Implications for
Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2512 n.24 (1992) (stating that
"postmodernism can serve the interests of right-wing dissenting or nonmainstream
ideas as well as marginal left-wing perspectives"). But see Dennis W. Arrow,
Spaceball (Or, Not Everything That's Left Is Postmodern), 54 VAND. L. REV. 2381,
2384-85, 2397 (2001) (generally describing postmodernists as embracing a "Leftist
Vision").
•• See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The
Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL Enuc. 155,
155 (1999) (stating that the "rhetoric of legal discourse believes that writing is a
process for constructing belief, not knowledge"); Lawrence Douglas, Constitutional
Discourse and Its Discontents: An Essay on the Rhetoric of Judicial Review, in
THE RHEToRIC OF LAw 225, 225-26 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1994} (invoking Plato's and Aristotle's works to describe two meanings for
"rhetoric"-argument to derive "the meaning rather than the truth of an event"
and the "ability to twist and manipulate words for the purposes of winning");
Linda Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal Truth, 67 U. CIN. L.
REv. 727, 729 (1999) (rejecting characterization of "rhetoric" as "sweet talk" or
manipulation and instead defming it as "the articulation of practical reason, a
bringing to words, and thereby experience, of practical deliberation that resists
formulation as rules or facts and may even become clearest for both the speaker
and the audience at times as analogy, metaphor, story, or image"); Richard A
Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1421,
1422 (1995) ("'[r)hetoric' is both broader and narrower than 'style.' It is broader
because it has, since Aristotle, connoted a process or reasoning as well as the
medium of verbal expression, a process that Aristotle contrasted with logic and
other modes of exact reasoning as being the mode appropriate for debate and
deliberation over matters of deep uncertainty."); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and
Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1546, 1548 (1990) (describing
"rhetoric" as "the discipline, sometimes the metadiscipline, in which objects of
formal study are the conventions of discourse and argument" and adding that
"[r)hetoric offers us a set of tools for thinking about the discursive conventions
within which we work").
23
James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural

2002]

"SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

457

probable "meaning" of an evene6 or any type of argument. 27
What distinguishes "crass manipulation" from probable
"meaning" depends upon a particular community's
experiences. 28 Some communities find arguments to be "crass
manipulation" but others will embrace the argument, labeling
it a "truth. "29 The difference in perception depends upon a
particular community's constructed standards, which arise
from its embedded experiences. In short, that which seems
persuasive (or that which seems "true") "must always be a
social construction," one mediated by our "social, cultural,
linguistic, and historical circumstances. "30 This article, with
its postmodernism perspectives, considers "rhetoric" as
indicative of cultural or community meaning rather than
objective, universal "truth. "31 In short, different communities
and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 687 (1985) (applying this denotation
to "the standard modem condemnations of government propaganda and of the
kind of advertising practiced by the wizards of Madison Avenue"); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 256 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that the
"commonest meaning of the word 'rhetoric' in every day speech . . . [is] empty
verbiage").
26
See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 24, at 226 (using the term "rhetoric" to
describe meaning, not truth, for questions not capable of being placed in
syllogisms, such as whether a "particular culture was in decline").
27
See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2551 (stating that Stanley Fish's
interpretative theory maintains that "[a]ll arguments . . . are rhetorical in nature"
and that "we cannot logically maintain that certain statements are true
representations of reality while others are 'mere' rhetoric"). The truthfulness of a
statement depends upon a community's standards: "those arguments and
statements that we consider persuasive are experienced by us as true or as
substantive, while those we find empty or contrary to our understandings are
experienced as rhetorical." Schanck, supra note 23, at 2551-52.
26
Schanck, supra note 23, at 2551-52.
29
See, e.g., Schnack, supra note 23, at 2551.
•• Schanck, supra note 23, at 2551.
31
Professor James Boyd White has described law as "constitutive rhetoric:"
Both the lawyer and the lawyer's audience live in a world in which their
language and community are not flXed and certain but fluid, constantly
remade, as their possibilities and limits are tested. The law is an art of
persuasion that creates the objects of its persuasion, for it constitutes
both the community and the culture it commends.
White, supra note 25, at 691; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN.
L. REv. 677, 690 (1999) (describing Michael Foucault as viewing the world as a
"rhetorical structure," one that "possesses no antecedent order of its own, but
acquires one only through the constitutive organizing power of 'words'").
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construct different views of what is true, what is reasonable.
Part II considers the Court's shifting constructions of
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search." It highlights
that these shifting and conflicting views allow the Court to
wander down many different roads when interpreting what
constitutes a "search." For example, in 1987, Justice Scalia
simply stated, "[a] search is a search,"32 but in 2001, he
stated that doctrine should inform the Court "[i]n assessing
when a search is not a search."33 Part III then examines the
Court's application of its modern "search" definition in several
contexts; Part IV highlights the Court's rhetorical devices for
constructing a Fourth Amendment "search" in its most recent
decision, Kyllo v. United States. 34 It demonstrates the
importance of characterization in deciding cases and in
shifting or synthesizing "search" paradigms. Postmodern
perspectives aid us in understanding the Court's alleged
jurisprudential "mess." Instead of despairing about the
inconsistencies, the section suggests that these rhetorical
devices, created by a varieties of legal communities, give the
Court great flexibility to shape Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, whether to merely decide a pending case or to
foreshadow (and later explicitly construct) a new paradigm for
evaluating officials' use of emerging technologies.
I. POSTMODERNISM THEMES

Numerous definitions of "postmodernism" exist. 35 Some

32

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding officer's moving of
equipment was search under Fourth Amendment).
33
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (holding use of senseenhancing technology to gain information on interior of home was "search" under
Fourth Amendment.
,.. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
"' See, e.g., Harris, supra note 4, at 748 (stating that "[t)here are as many
different definitions of postmodernism as there are postmodernists"); Tracy E.
Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodemism, and Justice,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1539 n.12 (1995) (noting that "[p)ostmodernism is a
disputed term, one not susceptible to simple definition; and focusing on one important aspect of postmodernism-"postmodernism's denial that ideas exist apart
from the practices in which they are embodied"); Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern
Identity and the Legal Subject, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 455, 456 (1991) (stating that
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scholars have identified three aspects of postmodernism. 36
First, postmodernism is the time we live in;37 it is an historical period, one "originating just after World War II but gaining momentum as the sixties approached. "38 Postmodernism
first surfaced in the arts and included works by John Cage,
William Faulkner, Phillip Glass, Edvard Munch, and Andy

"[t)here are more than thirty-one flavors of postmodernism ... " and "the decision about what postmodernism is remains as fraught as ever-one reason why
postmodernism can maintain its franchise and even set up new outposts on
criticism's terrain"). Some scholars have described their works as a hybrid of
modernism and postmodernism. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CluTIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: /fin de sieclel 17 (1997) (characterizing his writings as "left wing and
modernistlpostmodernist").
ss See,
e.g., LIToWITZ, supra note 4, at 7-19; Balkin, Postrnodern
Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1967-72. Some scholars have created two
broad categories-the historical and theoretical-to focus a discussion of what constitutes postmodernism. See, e.g., Wicke, supra note 35, at 457 (referring to a
"historical periodization where the postmodem genuinely described a convergence
of historical phenomena" and "congeries of theoretical suppositions about the nature of language, texts and human subjects within the lens of the social"). And
others have created their own labels to describe these distinctions. See, e.g.,
James Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 493, 497 (1999) (stating postmodernism has two aspects:
a "cultural schtick," which he labels "pomo," and an "earnest epistemology whose
natural habitat is the Modem Language Association annual conference").
37
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 38 (2000) (stating
that "postmodernism certainly is not over"). Professor Feldman believes that
"postmodernism is best understood as an extant intellectual, cultural, and social
era that, in fact, is still in its youth." Id.; see also TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM 20 (1996) (stating that "we are living in . . .
postmodernism"); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 68 (1995) (stating that "[t)his generation, Generation X, belongs to a particular epoch, namely, that of postmodernism"); Balkin,
Postrnodern Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1967 (arguing postmodernity is
current cultural era); Lipkin, see supra note 23, at 332 (stating that the "present
age is contingently regarded by many as the age of postmodernity"). See generally
Schanck, supra note 23, at 2560 (noting the "absence of a general postmodem
zeitgeist" and the lack of "widespread recognition that people's view of reality are
social constructions"). For example, a search in Westlaw of the phrase
"postmodem!" in the tp-all database gets intercepted by the company because it
would result in too many citations, but a search of allfeds and allstates databases
resulted in a total of only fourteen citations. (Search conducted June 27, 2002).
But see Patterson, supra note 11, at 257 n.9 (stating that "[w)hether or not we
are in postmodernity is, of course, very much open to question").
ss See LITOWITZ, supra note 4, at 8.
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Warhol, to name a few. 39 These artists "stressed the breakdown of linear narrative" and "the rise of pastiche. >Ho Second,
"postmodernism is also the set of cultural products created
during the era of postmodernity, >Hl "such as film, television,
fax machines, cable television, video and the Internet. >H2
Third, postmodernism is a "set of general perspectives for
interpreting and evaluating culture and the products of culture.>Hs Although these three levels in part explore new
boundaries, postmodern legal interpretation theory has focused on how different communities construct different boundaries or perspectives. As a result, multiplicity is a strong
theme within postmodernism as a philosophy, but not within
one's circle. 44 As one scholar aptly noted, "[a] postmodern philosophy does not---eannot-lead to a postmodern way of life>H5
because within our own circle we do not embrace this multiplicity. Many scholars have attempted to describe this
postmodern philosophical perspective by constructing different
themes for postmodernism and modernism. 46As the language
suggests, postmodernity follows modernity. 47 Modernism's

•• See, e.g., L!Towrrz, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that movement began "just
after World War II but gaining momentum as the sixties approached); see Wicke,
supra note 35, at 458-59.
40
L!ToWITL, supra note 4, at 8.
" Balkin, Postmodern Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1969.
2
•
Douglas Litowitz, In Defense of Postmodernism, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 41
(2000) (arguing postmodernism can be understood on three corresponding levels);
see also Balkin, Postmodern Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1969. But see
Boyle, supra note 36, at 497 n.6 (rejecting communications developments as an
aspect of postmodernism, but agreeing as to the arts forms that emerged).
.. Balkin, Postmodern Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1971.
" See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2560 (stating that "simply because
intellectuals may believe that truth is contingent and local does not mean that
most people do").
.. Schanck, supra note 23, at 2560.
.., See, e.g., L!Towrrz, supra note 4, at 10-17 (using contrasting quotations
from postmodernist and modernist writers to highlight different perspectives);
Schanck, supra note 23, at 2507 (describing postmodernism as the "prevailing
paradigm" "underlying critical legal studies").
•• See, e.g., JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN EXPLAINED: CORRESPONDENCE 1982-1985 12-13 (1993). Lyotard answered the question "What then is
the postmodem?," with a paradox: "A work can become modem only if it is first
postmodem. Thus, understood, postmodernism in not modernism at its end, but in
a nascent state, and ~ state is recurrent." I d. He further added,
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time frame spanned from "mid-Enlightenment to the 1960s
and early 1970s.»t8 Modernism represented a belief in a foundation, one that "would support and constrain judicial
decisionm.aking. »49 With respect to constitutional interpretation, modernism represented a belief that by using reason, we
would be able to ascertain objective principles-to "discover the
correct constitutional methodology."50 In addition, modernism
believed in "the existence of a neutral and objective faculty of
reason which can be used to generate first principles of morality and law. "51
Scholars have identified several general intellectual stages of modernism. 52 In the first stage, lawyers and courts re"Postnuxlernism would be understanding according to the paradox of the future
(post) anterior (modo)." ld. at 15.
48
LrroWITL, supra note 4, at 7; see also Schanck, supra note 23, at 2575
(noting that legal realists "presaged postmodernism by rejecting legal formalism,"
but that not until the 1970s with the Critical Legal Studies movement did
"postmodernism concepts again become highly visible"). But see Patterson, supra
note 11, at 256 n.9 (stating that "[m)odernity is that period in human history
which begins with the Enlightment and continues to the present").
•• See, e.g., MINDA, supra note 37, at 224-25 (stating that "modernity characterizes the view of traditional jurisprudential scholars who shared a common
belief in the possibility of systematizing legal knowledge using coherent and verifiable propositions about the nature of law and adjudication"); Robert L. Hayman,
Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postnuxlern Constitutional
Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57, 59 n.5 (1995) (discussing the definition of postmodernism). Professor Hayman has noted that even though
postmodernism "remains a very loose pastiche of ideas-the discourse is multidimensional, multi-directional, and largely unbounded"-it nevertheless calls "into
question modernism's central beliefs in rationality, autonomy, progress, and selfawareness." ld.; see also Higgins, supra note 35, at 1539 n.9 (defining
'"modernism' loosely as a form of thought that seeks to create a general theory
about the representation of nature in the mind" and adding that the "modernist
or foundationalist theory of representation provides a cross-cultural and transhistorical account of truth and rationality that in turn serves as a basis for social
criticism").
50
Lipkin, supra note 23, at 321. Lipkin also stated that the "hallmark of the
modern age was the commitment to reason, science, ethics, and more generally,
the conviction that these disciplines reflected an independent reality." Lipkin,
supra note 23, at 328.
61
LrroWITL, supra note 4, at 10.
02
See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 22-28 (describing four stages of modernism: "rationalism," "empiricism," "transcendentalism," and "late crisis"); MINDA,
supra note 37, at 13-80. Professor Minda has created numerous categories for
modernism, marking 1871, as the beginning of American modern jurisprudence,
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jected natural law as a foundation for decisions. 53 Instead of
looking to churches or the King for knowledge, 54 they looked
to positivism and viewed· law as a science after the Civil
War. 55 Law was "a transcendent object or transcendent subject, unaffected by social and economic context. "56 In the second stage, American legal realism occurred, which "turned to
experience as the source of objectivity,"away from the belief
that "abstract rules could disclose legal truths. "57 Legal pro-

with the publication of the first contracts casebook, MINDA, supra note 37, at 13;
the Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, MINDA, supra note 37, at 25;
the Legal Process movement of 1940s and 1950s, which tried to explain "how
respect for procedure and principled decision making might lead judges to outcomes that conform to institutional and democratic norms," MINDA, supra note 37,
at 34; the "neutral principles" of the 1960s, MINDA, supra note 37, at 37; "normative legal thought" of the post-1960s, MINDA, supra note 37, at 57.
•• See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 269 n.68 (noting that "premodern
categories" were "religious authority[] and cosmology-an understanding of the
world that explains the existence of the universe by postulating the existence of a
deity").
.. See also Lipkin, supra note 23, at 326. Professor Lipkin has noted that in
the pre-modern era "[o)ne had the right to proclaim knowledge only when one's
position in society so permitted" and that "the word of the Pope or King, or their
representative was law." Lipkin, supra note 23, at 326. He explained that the
ability to declare knowledge depended not on an individual's intellectual inquiry,
but rather on "membership in particular groups, such as the church, the crown,
the aristocracy, guilds, and other associations." Lipkin, supra note 23, at 326 .
.. FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 83-105. See also Patterson, supra note 11, at
263 n.41 (stating that "[i)f any single theme runs through the whole of modernity
it is the idea of autonomy," adding that "in politics, the subject is free to decide
her own conception of the good; in the art, the work of art must be allowed to
'speak for itself").
•• MINDA, supra note 37, at 14.
1
"
FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 113. Other scholars have described differently
this period, labeling the legal science and legal realist movements as "marginal
academic movements." For example, Professor Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg
have characterized different stages within their categories of "Progressive Interpretation" and the "Crisis of Progressive Interpretation." See BINDER & WEISBERG,
supra note 11, at 56-111. Binder and Weisberg noted,
Morton Horwitz has defmed Legal Realism broadly as including any attack on legal science (variously characterized as legal orthodoxy or classical legal thought) in the name of Progressive social policy. . . . Since we
see legal science as an aspect of, or at most a dialectical moment in, the
evolution of Progressive legal thought, we fmd this defmition ultimately
unhelpful. It amounts to building an ideologically and epistemologically
purified Progressivism by projecting much of its conservative, technocratic,
and elitist currents onto a fictively coherent opponent. This evades the
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cess theory developed during the third stage, which believed
in "right" answers to legal questions, rejecting legal realism's
embracing of legal indeterminacy. 58 Legal process theorists
studied institutions and their competencies. 59 In the final
stage, crisis occurred, with some scholars characterizing it as
the "Age of Anxiety." At this time, contemporary social problems seemed no longer addressed by law's authority; for some,
"the authority of the law was seen as part of the problem. JJ60
Many scholars still vehemently (and at times acrimoniously)61 debate what we mean by the labels "modernist" and
"postmodernist.JJS2 Even though postmodernism "is neither a

challenge of understanding how ideas that today seem antithetical could
have coexisted in the same discourses, the same social circles, and the
same minds. We think it better to treat Legal Science and Legal Realism
as necessarily marginal academic movements, illuminating sideshows to
and rhetorical hypertrophies of mainstream legal thought.
Id. at 81 n.288.
68
See MINDA, supra note 37, at 34.
59
See, e.g., MINDA, supra note 37, at 34-35; FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 121
(stating the legal process theorists contended that "reasoned elaboration meaningfully constrain[ed] judges in ways that executive officers, legislators, and administrators [were] not constrained").
110
MINDA, supra note 37, at 66. See also FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 126
(stating that stage was "characterized by deeply inconsistent attitudes and projects-anxiety, despair, anger, denunciations, and increasingly complex modernist
solutions that seized upon a combinations of rationalism, empiricism, and transcendentalism").
81
See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and the
Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997) (using
"newspeak" and satire to capture the author's view that postmodernism has nothing to offer to any one, and ironically not defining "modernism" in this mammoth
article). For an excellent (and readable) response, see Stephen Feldman, supra
note 37, at 2362 (rejecting the view that postmodernism is tied to "nihilism, idealism, [and] relativism"); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Legal Scholarship
at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption, 77 TEx. L. REv. 321, 325
(1998) (hypothesizing reasons for Arrow to write (and the law review's decision to
publish) a 228-page parody).
82
See, e.g., john a. powell, The Multiple Self· Exploring Between and Beyond
Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1505 (1997) (ironically
noting that a "number of writers have suggested that postmodernism derives from
and depends on modernism and that the very attempt to disprove modernism is
based on modernist assumptions"). Even self-described postmodernists have ironically noted that by labeling a period as "modernism" or "postmodernism" one is
not expressing a postmodernist's perspective because postmodernism is antiessentialism; yet, because postmodernism is also rooted in paradoxes and irony,
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theory nor a concept,m;s some scholars have nevertheless attempted to construct broad themes describing postmodernism,
recognizing that their perspectives would necessarily lay the
groundwork for both criticism and contradiction. 64 Some of
one may still characterize modernism and postmodernism. See, e.g., FELDMAN,
supra note 37, at 40-41.
aa MINDA, supra note 37, at 224 (stating that postmodernism is "a skeptical
attitude or aesthetic" that rejects grand theories and the belief in a "complete and
coherent" legal system); see also Schanck, supra note 23, at 2597 (stating that
"the practice of theory is a perfectly legitimate activity from a postmodem perspective, but not if it attempts to guide practices from an Olympian perspective").
"' See, e.g., EAGLETON, supra note 37, at vii (defming "postmodernity" as "a
style of thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth, reason, identity
and objectivity, of the idea of universal progress or emancipation, of single frameworks, grand narratives or ultimate grounds of explanation"); FELDMAN, supra
note 37, at 44 (referring to the "pastiche of postmodem practices" after describing
eight themes of postmodernism: the rejection of foundations and essentialism, id.
at 163; the rejection of certainties, and boundaries, id. at 166; the recognizing of
numerous paradoxes, id. at 169; the "focus on power and its manifold manifestations," id. at 169; the "social construction of the self or subject," id. at 174; the
analysis of a postmodernist's own orientation, id. at 179; the "use of irony," id. at
180; and political "ambivalence," id. at 181; LITowrrz, supra note 4, at 10-19
(describing themes of postmodernism: rejecting the idea of objective reason; viewing "human behavior" as "socially constructed"; believing that "truth is constructed, changing, and affected by the distorting influences of class, race, and gender";
rejecting "self-evident principles of justice and natural law"; believing that texts
have multiple meanings and "no ultimate meaning"; rejecting the notion of history
reflecting "moral progress"; and recognizing the difficulty and irony of using language to challenge modernist perspectives"); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC
SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 4-5 (1997)
(viewing the themes of postmodernism as including the following: '"a conviction
that no single a priori thought system should govern belief"; the world forms
'"the background and condition of every cognitive actm; "'[a]ll human understanding is interpretation, and no interpretation is finalm; in discerning truth and reality, a person '"can never presume to transcend the manifold predispositions of his
or her subjectivicym; and '"all meaning [of a text] is ultimately undecidablem)
(quoting RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND: UNDERSTANDING
THE IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD VIEW 95-99 (1991)); Schanck, supra
note 23, at 2508 (describing the following themes as interrelated: the self is
"purely a social, cultural, historical, and linguistic creation"; because there are no
foundational principles, "certainty as the result of either empirical verification or
deductive reasoning is impossible"; "[t]here can be no such thing as knowledge of
reality"; "all propositions and all interpretations, even texts, are themselves social
constructions"). See generally BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT
231 n.18 (2d 1999) (listing five general themes of postmodernism: "rejecting the
idea of a foundational or transcendent source for truth or justification;" "rejecting
the notion of determinate unique meanings or statements, texts, or events;" asserting "that truth and identity are socially constructed or culturally constructed;"
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these broad-brushed themes provide an excellent horizon for
scrutinizing the Supreme Court's multiple constructions of
what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search," as later discussed in Parts 11-IV.
One important theme of postmodernism is the rejection of
foundations, which discards the idea of a singular Truth. 65 In
contrast to modernism, which viewed reason as the avenue to
objectivity, 66 postmodernism does not see this road. Instead,
it sees multiple roads ahead because multiple communities
compose our society and each one has its own "truth.J>S7

rejecting grand narratives (e.g., seeing history as a movement towards ever greater rationality or ever greater liberty, or seeing law as a movement 'from status to
contract')"; and emphasizing "the irrational or unconscious influences on action
and belief'). For a discussion of these authors' themes, see infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
65
See, e.g., LITOWITZ, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that "postmodernists are
skeptical about the notion of a flxed Truth (with a capital letter)" and quoting
Michael Foucault, Truth and Power, in PoWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS
AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977, 133 (Colin Gordon et al. trans. & ed., New
York Pantheon 1980) ("'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of
power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and
which extend it. A 'regime' of truth"); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF
REAsoN 144 (1998) ("What is called reason these days is very often not. Very
often 'reason' is little more than a pleasant name for faith, dogma, prejudice, and
company."); Francis J. Mootz, The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholar·
ship, 31 Hous. L. REv. 873, 885 (1994) (stating that •antifoundational accounts of
the rule of law . . . emphasize that the law never operates outside the context of
wider social struggles to defme the terms of sociopolitical organization"); see also
LITOWITZ, supra note 4, at 9-10 (stating that postmodernists reject the "notion
that the just state can be founded upon flrst principles" and that they "deny the
existence of a neutral and objective faculty of reason which can be used to generate first principles of morality and law"). See generally Schanck, supra note 23, at
2559 (stating that the "factor that would transform the nature of the human
condition from modern to postmodern is a general sense that all knowledge is
contingent and that the truth is subject to context").
88
See, e.g., Lipkin, supra note 23, at 328 (stating that modernism viewed
reason and science as the means to "reveal the complete truth about physical and
moral reality"); Patterson, supra note 11, at 266 (stating that "knowledge on the
modernist view is foundational, whether derived from rationalism or empiricism,"
but noting that language may be representational but that "truth" does not apply
to "moral judgments").
67
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH POSTMODERNISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE ENDS OF PHll..OSOPHY 178 (1990). Norris has criticized
postmodernists for believing that "all theories, truth-claims, ethical principles, etc.,
must be construed in terms of some given consensus or 'interpretive community.'"
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Postmodernism contends that "[h]uman knowledge is the historically contingent product of linguistic and social practices of
particular local communities of interpreters, with no assured
'ever-closer' relation to an independent ahistorical reality.~
Postmodernism rejects the idea of an objective truth, an objective historical narrative,69 an objective "X."70 In short,
postmodernism "challenges the possibility of grounding reason

Id. As a result, postmodernists would continue debating, but realize that "(at
some level) that there were no ultimate truths to be had, no ground-rules or
principles beyond those offered by the range of currently available beliefs." I d.; see
also Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1,
31 (1997) (stating "the image of the consumer as someone induced from outside to
enter the circle of liberal justification is wrong. In many important senses, the
consumer is already within the circles of liberal justification").
68
TAMANAHA, supra note 64, at 4 (quoting RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF
THE WESTERN MIND: UNDERSTANDING THE IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD
VIEW 95-99 (1991)).
69
For an excellent, in-depth analysis of shifting constructions of history in
constitutional law, see G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional
Scholarship 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002). Professor White has noted that
interpreters' claim to historical "objectivity" represents their belief that past is
separate from the present. Id. at 492. In contrast, when interpreters view the
present as linked to the past, their view "undermines a strong belief in historical
objectivity." I d. at 493. For White, even when "present actors" view their circumstances different from the past, they cannot claim history to be "entirely
'irrelevant' to their existence." Id. at 614. He views them as acting "with the
weight of their immediate past pressing upon them." ld.; see also Thomas Y.
Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of
the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine, in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239, 246 (2002). Professor Thomas Davies has
vehemently attacked the Court's perspective historical analysis of the Fourth
Amendment in Atwater, which held that an officer acted reasonably when conducting a warrantless custodial arrest for minor offense. He stated that the
Court's "supposed historical analysis consisted almost entirely of rhetorical ploys
and distortions of historical sources." Id. He also claimed that the Court "omitted"
historical sources that are "plainly inconsistent with framing-era doctrine." Id. at
246-47. Although a postmodernist would view such conflicting constructions of
history as inevitable, the sharp contrast between Professor Davies' historical perspective and the Court's perspective highlights the role of rhetorical devices in
constructing an historical argument.
70
See, e.g., LITOWI'I"L, supra note 4, at 34-35 (stating that postmodernism
rejects the "foundational concepts" of "neutrality, justice, reason, history, nature,
the social contract, God, the rational self, and the inherent autonomy of the individual"; adding that "postmodernism is characteristically critical, seeking to expose
the foundations of modem jurisprudence as constructs or ideologies which parade
as eternal verities").
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in anything other than actual social practices. "71

Another way to describe postmodernism's rejection of
foundations is to consider the term "antiessentialism."72
Essentialism has a core73 ; antiessentialism has no static core.
As a result, the postmodernist contends that any paradigm
attempting to capture the essence of a doctrine or a person's
identity necessarily reflects its own particular community's
view, not the view of all communities. 74

71

Lipkin, supra note 23, at 329.
n See, e.g., powell, supra note 62, at 1484 (stating that the "tensions between
modernism and postmodernism are often framed in terms of essentialism and
antiessentialism" and arguing that resolving this tension is not necessary to understand "intersectionalism's claim of a decentered nonunitary self").
•• See, e.g., Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 19 (1995) (defming
essentialism as "the notion that there is a single woman's, or Black person's, or
any other group's experience that can be described as independently from other
aspects of the person-that there is an 'essence' to that experience"); Note, Patriarchy is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of A Postrnodern Account of Gender, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1973, 1973 (1995) (defining and criticizing essentialism's
search to fmd to "common trait that unites all women and constitutes a core of a
universal female identity"); see also IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
WHAT! 16 (1999) (stating that "[v]ery often essentialism is a crutch for racism").
Professor Hacking explained what "essentialism" means as applied to race:
[E]ssentialism is an especially strong form of background assumption. . . .
If a person's race is an essential element of a person's being, then race is
not inevitable only in the present state of affairs. It is inevitable, period,
so long as there are human beings . . . . Essentialists (usually more implicit than explicit in their beliefs) hold that one's race is part of one's
essence,
I d.
•• See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for
Equality, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 3 (2000). Professor Nan Hunter has described the antiessentialist perspective of postmodernism when considering the
construction of identity:
Postmodernist politics rejected both the modernist themes of individual
autonomy and universal values, as well as the belief that identity politics
claims were necessarily liberatory. The postmodern critique of identity
politics asked: if identity claims are to be legitimate, who among the
group gets to formulate and voice the substance of such claims?
Antiessentia!ists caveats tc easy notions of a unitary conception, for example, of "woman," or a single narrative or women's life experiences, complicated theories of equality. Postmodernism functioned in many respects as
a dissent against certain features of identity politics, challenging identity
orthodoxy and suggesting that overreliance on concepts like personhood
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The difference between modernism's essentialism and
postmodernism's antiessentialism was expressed in the contrasting views of feminists. Some early modernists feminists
attempted to describe "woman" "by a preconceived and limited
set of abstract characteristics, perspectives, or interests."75
Essentialist theory failed because "it picked one pebble and
asked it to represent all" women. 76 Later postmodern feminists challenged essentialism, contending that the studied
"pebble" failed to include "women of color, lesbians, and poor
women. "77 They proposed the theory of an "intersectional
self,"78 which was composed of multiple, contradictory selves
that would arise depending upon the particular context. 79 In
short, later feminists saw the self as fractured, "relational and
fluid," and "strongly linked to context."80

causes as many problems as it solves. Often this strain of criticism took
the form of further specification of unrecognized identities.
Id.; see also powell, supra note 62, at 1497 (stating that postmodernists "tend to
agree with the notion of the self as relational and fluid-dependent upon the context in which it exists").
75
FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 160.
78
Grillo, supra note 73, at 21.
77
Id. (citing, inter alia, Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585-602 (1990); AUDRE LoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 110-13 (1984)); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Cracking Foundations as
Feminist Metlwd, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 31, 32 n.5 (2000) (collecting works that described the numerous approaches to feminism, including "equality stage," "difference stage," and "diversity stage," linking the latter to
postmodernism).
78
See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 73, at 18 (rejecting the idea that the "situation
of Black women is the composite of the situations of white women and Black
men"; explaining that "we all stand at multiple intersections of our fragmented
legal selves"); see also powell, supra note 62, at 1495-96 (relating the concept of
intersectional self to postmodernism's view of a fractured and multiple seiO.
79
powell, supra note 62, at 1495.
80
powell, supra note 62, at 1497. Professor Grillo described well how we experience these multiple selves:
Each of us in the world sits at the intersection of many categories: She is
Latina, woman, short, mother, lesbian, daughter, brown-eyed, long-haired,
quick-witted, short-tempered, worker, stubborn. At any one moment in
time and in space, some of these categories are central to her being and
her ability to act in the world. Others matter not at all. Some categories,
such as race, gender, class, and sexual orientation, are important most of
the time. Others are rarely important. When something or someone highlights one of her categories and brings it to the fore, she may be a domi-
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Echoing this antiessentialism perspective is "outsider" or
"other" jurisprudence. 81 This jurisprudence describes a person
as an "other" when she feels "fragmented by society's dominant discourse."82 As one scholar has noted, "[T]he experience
of otherness ... exists across time and culture as the inevitable product of social organization. "83 This jurisprudence has
contended that those individuals who possessed power constructed legal doctrines from their own perspective, failing to
question how other communities would view these doctrines.84 The product of this power was a "legal system [that]
has consistently functioned to create and perpetuate the privi-

nant person, an oppressor of others. Other times, even most of the time,
she may be oppressed herself. She may take lessons she has learned
while in a subordinated status and apply them for good or ill when her
dominant categories are highlighted. For example, having been mistreated
as a child, she may be either a carefully respectful or an abusive parent.
Grillo, supra note 73, at 17; see also Patterson, supra note 11, at 257 n.9 (stating
that "postmodernism poses a threat to any form of feminist critique that issues
from a perspective assuming or presupposing a position outside the (dominant)
discourse of (gendered) law").
81
For an excellent collection of articles in this genre, see CRITICAL RAcE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
82
powell, supra note 62, at 1491. Professor Powell has illustrated how one
becomes an "other" by relating the story of a young girl, who first lived in a
"Negro town" until age 13, and became a "little colored girl" when she went to
school with white children. powell, supra note 62, at 1492 (quoting Zora Neale
Hurston, How It Feels to be Colored Me, in I LoVE MYSELF WHEN I AM LAUGHING 152-53 (Alice Walker ed., 1979).
83
Samuel A Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646,
688 (2001).
N
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 5, at 2374 (arguing that "we cannot understand how constitutional doctrine should be organized until we understand how
society is organized"). Professor Jack Balkin has recognized the need for constitutional interpretation to recognize our diverse communities:
[We need] to look carefully at the structure of the society in which we
live, to identify social stratification where it exists, and to recognize the
possible connections between the moral justifications that majorities offer
and the preservation of their superior status . . . . Social hierarchies
appear in many forms and degrees: We should not imagine that there is
a single test or a single clause of the Constit"...ttion that can deal with all
of them fully and adequately.
Balkin, supra note 5, at 2374; see also Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on
the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 117, 129-30 (2001) (proposing rules for
police officers in conducting traffic stops to check their bias against minorities).
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lege of White males"85 Outsider scholarship has reflected
postmodernism's view of multiple communities by critically
examining the privilege that whites and males have in society.86 In addition, to discern this outsider or other,
postmodernists have deconstructed texts. 87
Resonating with the themes of antifoundationalism,
antiessentialism and outsider jurisprudence is
postmodernism's embracing of social construction theor18 or
"constructionism."89 Under this theory, how we perceive the
86

powell, supra note 62, at 1483.
See CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LoOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard
Delgado and Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) for an excellent collection of articles examining the privileges that whites and males possess in our society. See Balkin,
supra note 5, at 2321 (highlighting that "[c)ritical race scholars have repeatedly
noted that white Americans have certain status privileges conferred on them
merely by being white"). See generally Schanck, supra note 23, at 2588 n.331
(describing that some feminists adopting postmodem perspectives may sense an
undermining of their "feminist goal of portraying male chauvinism as unalterably
evil in nature;" stating that this conflict arises from their suspending "judgment
about behavior in an effort to relate to or connect with others and to empathize
with them").
87
See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice,
92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1994) (describing deconstruction's furthering justice
by allowing communication with the outsider or other). See also Patterson, supra
note 11, at 272-73:
Postmodem approaches to language do not present arguments against the
modem, representationalist view. Rather, postmodernist conceptions of the
word-world relation see the modernist picture of propositional, representational truth as unintelligible-as a project that never gets off the ground.
The focus of the dispute is the modernist theory of correspondence, specifically, the Sentence-Truth-World relation. To put it in a nutshell, the
postmodem alternative replaces the modernist picture of Sentence-TruthWorld with an account of understanding that emphasizes practice, warranted assertability, and pragmatism.
Id. (citations omitted).
88
See, e.g., Lrrowrrz, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that postmodernists "assert
that the self is a product of language and discourse, that it is 'decentered' . . .
and that there is no core self'; adding that "postmodernists tend to hold that
human behavior is socially constructed, molded by tradition and practices"). See
generally HACKING, supra note 73, at 7 (stating that "[u)ndoubtedly the most
influential social construction doctrines have had to do with gender").
89
HACKING, supra note 73, at 39. Philosopher Ian Hacking fmds redundant
the phrase "social construction." HACKING, supra note 73, at 39 (stating that
"[m]ost items said to be socially constructed could be constructed only socially, if
they are constructed at all"; recommending using "social" only for "emphasis or
contrast"). Because of his dissatisfaction with the phrase and its overuse, Hacking
86
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"self' or a "subject" depends upon a person's particular commUnity, its "social structures and cultural symbols.mlll A person does not have an "essence;,g1 nor does she choose her
own ideology, but rather her community provides the "framework" for her choices. 92
In attempting to limit or frame social construction theory,
philosopher Ian Hackin~3 has argued that three aspects represent the "starting point" of social construction theory: (1)
"the existence or character of X is not determined by the nature of things;" (2) "X is not inevitable;" and (3) "X was
brought into existence or shaped by social events, forces history, all of which could well have well been different. "94 Ideas,
theories and laws are obvious examples of social construction

has recommended using the word "constructionism." HACKING, supra note 73, at
48.
90
FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 174; see also Marcosson, supra note 83, at 684
(noting that "there is widespread acceptance of the premise that concepts of self
are culture-dependent"). Professor Samuel Marcosson has linked self-concept to
cultural experiences by relying on the works of cognitive psychologists and sociologists:
[T]he very notion of self-understanding as affected by cultural context
understates the importance of context: "the very core of self-understanding
is constructed through, and reflects on, social interactions. Rather than
understanding the self in cultural context or situating the self in interpersonal space, we argue for understanding the self as a social-cultural process.
Marcosson, supra note 83, at 683-84 (quoting Robyn Fivush & Janine Buckner, The
Self as Socially Constructed: A Commentary, in THE CONCEPI'UAL SELF lN CONTEXT
176 (Urlric Neisser & David Jopling eds., 1997).
91
FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 175.
92
FELOMAN, supra note 37, at 174; see also Marcosson, supra note 83, at 687
(describing the labels "masculine" and "feminine" as social constructs and noting
that "some traits or roles might be (and often are) masculine in one culture and
feminine in another"). But see Todd Zywicki, Evoluntionary Psyclwlogy and the
Social Sciences, 13 HUMANE STUD. REV. 1, 'I 10 (2000), available at http:!/
libertyguide.orgllibertyguide/hsrlhsr/phpl36.html (rejecting the tabula rasa theory,
the idea of "blank personalities subject to molding by social, cultural, legal, political, and economic forces economic focus theory," as "Darwinism from the neck up"
(citing Todd J. Zywicki, The Nature of the State and the State of Nature: A Com;r.er.t on. Grady and lrfcGuire, 1 J. BIOECONOMICS, 241 (1999).
'"' See HACKING, supra note 73, at 19 (stating sarcastically that "[s]ocial construct is code for not universal, not part of pan-cultural human nature, and don't
tread on me with those heavy hegemonic [racist, patriarchal] boots of yours").
,.. HACKING, supra note 73, at 6-7.
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because we easily discem that a particular society shaped
them, for example, the cultural view of what constitutes "child
abuse, "95 legal requirements for citizenship96 or the establishing of a speed limit on a highway. 97 What social construction theory is about is describing the areas that people do not
easily perceive as socially created. 98 For example, social construction theory has examined race, 99 gender, identity and
the idea of objective reason, viewing these as products of our
culture. 100 Under this theory, Hacking discems six different
911

See, e.g., HACKING, supra note 73, at 146 (stating that "a great deal of
behavior that we hold intrinsically loathsome and terribly harmful to children is
merely venial or even encouraged in other cultures"; and adding that "[c)hild
abuse, as diagnostic and political concept, has chiefly been a phenomenon of the
English-speaking world; with the United States as almost the only source of conceptual innovation"); J. Robert Shull, Emotional and Psychological Child Abuse:
Notes on Discourse, History, and Change, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1665, 1697 (1999)
(describing the legal concept of child abuse as moving from a medical perspective
to perspectives embraced by "psychologists and sociologists").
96
Marcosson, supra note 83, at 688-89 (describing citizenship as a social construct, one rooted in "political, social, historical, legal, and econolnic forces on
geography").
97
See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Law as Interpretation, 76 Cm.-KENT L. REV.
779, 781 (2000) (stating that "without our current, contingent mix of legal practices and institutions, there would be no such thing as a speed lilnit at all").
98
See HACKING, supra note 73, at 12 (stating that "[i)f "everybody knows that
X is the contingent upshot of social arrangements, there is no point in saying
that it is socially constructed"). Social construction theory may unmask that which
is hidden. HACKING, supra note 73, at 20.
99
See, e.g., NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 1 (1995) (rejecting
biology as a means to identify race by describing the following "absurdit[y]": "a
white woman can give birth to a black child, but a black woman can never give
birth to a white child"; adding that "people are members of different races because they have been assigned to them"); Daniel G. Blackburn, Why Race Is Not
a Biological Concept, in RACE & RACISM IN THEORY & PRACTICE 3, 7 (Berel Lang
ed., 2000) (rejecting the biological construction of race, claiming that it is as reliable as referring to "a genetic background that is 'Californian,' 'Episcopalian,' or
'Republicanm); Jane Maslow Cohen, Race-Based Adoption in a Post-Loving Frame,
6 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 653, 669 (1997) (noting that social construction theory views
the "indeterlninacy of race," with "interracial marriage and interracial reproduction ... intilnidating the concept of race"); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994) (defining "race" as "a vast group of people
loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of
their morphology an/or ancestry" and stating that "race must be understood as a
sui generis social phenomenon in which contested systems of meaning serve as
the connections between physical features, races, and personal characteristics").
100
See, e.g., HACKING, supra note 73, at 33 (viewing social constructionists as
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uses of social construction theory: to reflect interest in history,
to be ironic, to either reform or unmask society's beliefs, to
rebel or to revolt. 101 Ironically, postmodernism itself is a social construction. 102
Social construction theory is also intertwined with another postmodern theme-the view that texts have multiple meanings because different communities construe them. 103 For the
postmodernist, "meaning is determined by the interpretative
conventions of the community."104 Because society has many
different communities, we will have multiple constructions,
whether of texts, identities or social norms. 105 Many of
postmodernism's themes have roots in the perception of multi-

believing that "classifications are not determined by how the world is, but are
convenient ways in which to represent it"); Lrrowrrz, supra note 4, at 11 (stating
that postmodernists would argue that "reason is not a uniform faculty of all humankind but rather is socially constructed; it is always situated within existing
practices ·and discourses, and it will therefore be biased or slanted in favor of
existing power relations").
101
HACKING, supra note 73, at 33.
1
0'J See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2581 (stating that postmodernists recognize that their positions are socially constructed).
103
See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 274 (stating that the "postmodem
approach to language eschews advancing explanations in favor of describing localized linguistic practices"); Schanck, supra note 23, at 2514 (stating that
postmodernism attracts both right-wing as well as left-wing ideals). Professor
Schanck has linked "two strains"-poststructuralism and neopragmatism-which,
though different, share a common view of language because of social construction
theory. Schanck, supra note 23, at 2514. Poststructuralism emphasizes "the role of
language and language's underlying structures in shaping our understandings of
reality and texts," and "neopragmatism emphasizes the social construction of
knowledge and language." Schanck, supra note 23, at 2514. Schanck has noted
the paradox of poststructuralism's view that "there is nothing outside of the text"
and neopramatism's view "that there is no text," other than the one we create
"through our preexisting, socially derived interpretations." Schanck, supra note 23,
at 2515 (quoting JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak trans., 1976). He has characterized the link as rooted in social construction theory: "[o)ur perspectives on the world are culturally and linguistically conditioned, that reality is never transparent to us, and that the content of our
knowledge depends on our different situations." Schnack, supra note 23, at 2515.
104
See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2547.
1011
See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 165 (stating that "the Other refers
not only to suppressed textual meanings but also to marginalized and subjugated
individuals and groups (outgroups)-those individuals and groups whose meanings
(or voices) are obscured or ignored").
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plicity because postmodernism discerns communities creating
different constructions. Postmodernism rejects a "true" interpretation of a text, 106 just as it rejects a "true" foundation for
legal analysis, or a "true" view of gender107 or identity. 108
As a result, when a postmodernist reads a text, the restraints
on interpretation arise from the community's conventions. For
example, when interpreting law, judges employ the conventions of the legal profession. 109 These conventions reflect a
particular community's passions and prejudices. 110 In addition, each community will perceive that it discerned "the correct and appropriate standards, not just one arbitrary set
among many acceptable alternatives. "m In the end, "the intricate concepts and methodologies of deconstruction are themselves only social. constructions, with no more right to privi106

Schanck, supra note 23, at 2547 (stating that because "[t)here can be no
single correct interpretation of any text," there is also no single correct evaluation
of "the practices, goals, morals, values, and norms of any institution or community").
107
See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 295 (stating that "[p)ostmodernism's
singular contribution to feminism has been to raise the stakes in the samenessdifference debate"). Professor Patterson has examined the work of postmodernist
Ziallah Eisenstein and noted that "all questions of difference are simply a matter
of one's own view" and that "their significance must remain open-textured." Id. at
297 (quoting ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 35 (1988)).
108
See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 11, at 276-77 (stating that postmodernism
"challenges the primacy of the individual"; postmodernism "casts the individual
not as the subject in control of discourse, but as an artifact produced by discourse").
109
See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 23, at 2545-46; see also Pierre Schlag, Clerks
in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2053, 2054 (1993) (noting that "[j)udges must
destroy the worlds of meaning that others have constructed" and that they used
the traditional '"rules,' 'doctrines,' and 'principlesm to mask their "highly self-interested constructions").
110
See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 165 (stating that "(w]henever we
understand a text from within our own horizon-which is the only way to understand a text-we necessarily deny potential meanings that might arise from some
other perspective or horizon"); Brice R. Wacheterhauser, Prejudice and Reason, in
HATRED, BIGOTRY, AND PREJuDICE: DEFINlTIONS, CAUSES, AND SOLUTIONS 155, 157
(1999) (stating that "the role of prejudice in cognition seems to render the ideal
of a fully explicit procedure impossible to achieve" because "an implicit element is
always involved inexorably in any method"). See generally Schanck, supra note 23,
at 2556 n.209 (noting that "multiculturalism . . . involves a recognition that various racial and ethnic groups constitute different interpretative communities with
different assumptions, conventions, and implicit values").
m Schanck, supra note 23, at 2548.
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leged status than any other." 112
These broad themes of postmodernism emphasize the
ever-shifting role communities play in creating society. They
highlight how communities construct foundations that reflect
their particular viewpoints, from creating (or ignoring) race as
a type of identity to interpretive principles for examining laws.
Underlying these themes is the contingency of social construction: what we create depends upon the community at a particular time in history. These postmodern perspectives help to
explain the United States Supreme Court's shifting constructions what constitutes a "search" police practice under the
Fourth Amendment.

II. COURT'S CONSTRUCTIONS OF A
FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEARCH"

When the United States Supreme Court decides a Fourth
Amendment issue, it frames its decision by using rationales
embraced by the communities of lawyers, judges and some
scholars. To date, the Court has not released an opinion stating, "We decide the case today this way because to do so is
simply good policy." Granted it may add such a statement
after offering other arguments to support its decision, 113 but
the way in which it talks about the Fourth Amendment issue
depends upon which rhetorical arguments it selects from the
communities' package of acceptable arguments. From a
postmodernist's perspective, the Court could have offered
several different justifications to support its holding, and the
Court could have decided many cases differently. In short,
multiple paths for decisionmaking are possible, and the
Court's jurisprudence in defining a Fourth Amendment
112

Schanck, supra note 23, at 2572.
See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). In Camara, the
Court examined and rejected many arguments for allowing warrantless administrative searches. It concluded by stating that "of course, in applying any reasonableness standard, includLng one of constitutional dimension, an argument that
the public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration."
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533. After considering what would constitute sound public
policy, the Court concluded that it did "not fmd the public need argument dispositive." ld.
113
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"search" reveals these different approaches.
In defining a Fourth Amendment "search," the Court has
familiar rhetorical tools at hand: textual arguments, 114 historical arguments, 115 structural arguments, 116 arguments
arising from precedents and explicit policy arguments. 117 Because the legal community has never stated that one type of

114
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from
Vagueness Doctrine? 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 401 (2001) ("Despite an explicit
reference in the Constitution's text that limits governmental intrusions, the
Court's Fourth Amendment cases regularly allow police broad discretion in conducting searches and seizures. At the same time, the Court's vagueness cases
have invalidated criminal statutes-even when they do not directly affect any
enumerated right-when the statutes grant police too much discretion.").
110
See, e.g., Morgan· Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1707, 1709 (1996) (noting that "[l]awyers writing briefs, judicial opinions, and scholarly commentaries tend to treat history as but one more
source of evidence to be deployed in support of their arguments"). After examining Fourth Amendment histories, Cloud warned "constitutional decision makers
[to) be skeptical when lawyers claim to have discovered the Amendment's precise
meaning in its complex history." Id. at 1746-47. For Cloud, the history of the
Fourth Amendment can nevertheless offer "broad background principles favoring
privacy, property, and liberty." Id. at 1747. He concluded, "illtimately, we do have
to make up our own minds about what the law will be in this time and in this
place." Id. see also David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 162 (2002) (highlighting the Court's inconsistent
consideration of history: the '"new Fourth Amendment originalism' . . . was obviously in considerable tension with the modernizing ahistorical approach of Katz
and Terry") (quoting David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1744 (2000)).
118
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founder's Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and
the Power of Technological Surveillance after Kyllo, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1325, 1328
(2002). By invoking a structural perspective, one linked to separation of powers
concerns, Professor Ku has argued against the Court's "removing entire categories
of searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny." Id. He has contended that "new
surveillance technologies must be treated as searches subject to Fourth Amendment restraints" in light of "the doctrine of separation of powers." ld. at 148. For
Professor Ku, this view of the Fourth Amendment would "protect the public from
arbitrary and unrestrained executive power." Id.
117
See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close In On
the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1103, 1141-60 (1992) (examin.ing
policy arguments in support and in opposition to police officers' need to obtain
warrants in a variety of circumstances). Professor Tomkovicz distinguished "policy"
arguments from "symbolic arguments," which he characterized as an examination
of "which symbols and messages are more compatible with the kind of society our
ancestors envisioned." Id. at 1162. He recognized that "[o)ur choices will undoubtedly be influenced by the symbols we see and the messages we hear" and that
"neither choice is incontrovertible." Id. at 1163.
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argument always trumps another type of argument, the Court
is able to wander down different paths simply by relying on a
different category to decide a similar issue. In addition, within
each category, the Court has a variety of arguments to support
its decision. For example, the Court may selectively cite cases
to support its position; it may distinguish other cases by creating a new gloss on prior cases that it now finds constitutionally sufficient; it may overrule prior cases or it may trash some
but not all of its prior cases by retaining the "essential holding" of a prior cases. The Court may also blend these constructed categories by weaving them together, as in looking to
history to illuminate what it discerns the text to mean. With
these diverse and contrasting rhetorical arguments, the Court
gets to choose how to frame and resolve a decision. 118
In deciding whether the challenged conduct was a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court's initial basis was property law; it then characterized
privacy as an essential component of determining whether a
"search" had occurred. In its move from property to privacy,
the Court cited language in old cases to make its shift to appear less jarring. The Court's broadly written 1886 decision in
Boyd v. United States, for example, has given the Court language to select and focus on at different times. The Boyd
Court discussed "the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security," the need to protect the "sanctity of a man's home
and privacies of life" and an "indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property."119 Later the
Court repeatedly referred to the Fourth Amendment as protecting "personal security," generally not to define a
"search,"120 but rather to describe an individual's interest
118

See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era:
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 583
(1996) (noting that even judges operating from a "formalist" perspective may ascribe "alternative outcomes for the same event."). I d. at 583. For Cloud, different
outcomes are possible because a "decisionmaker may conclude that the properties
suppressed by a particular rule are relevant to the events in the instant case,
and choose to apply an alternative rule that emphasizes those relevant characteristics while suppressing others accentuated by the rejected rule." ld.
119
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
120
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 n.8 (1948 ). In Johnson,

478

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 72

protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The categories of property and privacy (as well as personal security and liberty) from a postmodernist's view have permeable and overlapping boundaries, allowing us to understand
the Court's shifting rhetorical groundings. In the end, even
though we may view the Court's paths in defining a "search,"
we are not certain as to what a particular path means when
the facts under consideration are different from decided cases;
we do not know how long the Court will stay on that road, nor
do we know what the next road looks like and what its application will mean under the Fourth Amendment. What we do
know is that the Court, like academic scholars, offers arguments for constructing the meaning of the Constitution, which
is all it can do.
A. Constructing the Fourth Amendment with
a "Property" Foundation

The Court first extensively examined the Fourth Amendment in Boyd v. United States. 121 At issue was a
government's subpoena, issued pursuant to a statute, compelling a company to produce an invoice to show the purchase of
goods for which it had not paid duties. 122 The statute provided that if the company did not produce the papers, the
government's allegations were deemed true, allowing civil
the Court cited a 1921 decision broadly describing the rights protected by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution:
The effect of [our) decisions cited is: that such rights are declared to be
indispensable to the "full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty
and private property"; that they are to be regarded as of the very essence
of constitutional liberty; . . . these Amendments should receive a liberal
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or "gradual
depreciation" of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of
courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officer.
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 17 n.8 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 303, 304
(1921)). But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (declaring that "a careful
exploration of the outer surfaces a person's clothing all over his or her body in at
attempt to fmd weapons" is a search and noting such a frisk is a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person").
121
116 U.S. 616 (1886). For a brief discussion of the Court's prior references to
the Fourth Amendment, see Cloud, supra note 118, at 573 n.77.
122
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18.
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forfeiture of the allegedly purchased goods. 123 In determining
that this compulsory process of private papers was an "unreasonable search and seizure,"124 the Court did not define what
constituted a "search" or "seizure,"125 but it did describe a
"right" protected by the Fourth Amendment: the "right of
personal security, personal liberty, and privacy property,
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction for
some public offence."126 Yet, in deciding the case, the Court
focused on property law. 127
The Boyd Court distinguished between property in which
the government was entitled to possess and that which is it
was not. Lawful possession lay in the "seizure of stolen
goods, "128 "seizure of goods forfeited a breach of revenue
laws"129 and "goods seized on attachment. "130 Unlawful possession in this case arose from compelling a person to produce
"private" papers. The Court stated that the "two things differ
toto coelo. "131 The Court thus constructed classes and stated
that the classes were different, a classic rhetorical tool.
To justify its distinctions, the Court cited another classic

123

Id. at 621-22.
at 622.
123
Id. (implying that "compulsory production of a man's private papers" was
"equivalent" to a "search and seizure").
128
Id. at 630.
127
Id. at 623-24. Professor Morgan Cloud has differently characterized the
Fourth Amendment foundation that the Court created in Boyd by viewing the
decision through the lens of its era-Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908).
Cloud, supra note 118, at 580. Cloud strongly emphasized the Court's explicit
references to "liberty" and acknowledged a role for implicit linking of property
interests with an individuaPs interest in "liberty" or "personal autonomy." Cloud,
supra note 118, at 580. He explained that "the Boyd decision is provocative precisely because it defmed this realm of personal autonomy largely in terms of
property rights." Cloud, supra note 118, at 580. Earlier, however, he noted that
such categories are not discrete: "Personal security, liberty, and private property
are not discrete interests; they unite to define significant attributes of individual
freedom in the democracy." Cloud, supra note 118, at 576. See generally AKmL
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND Cru:MINAL PROCEDURE: FIRsT PRINCIPLES 23
(1997) (criticizing Boyd for its embracing of "property worship").
128
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623.
m Id.

129
130

131

[d.

!d. at 624.
Id. at 623.
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rhetorical tool-framer's intent. 132 The Court stated that its
property class distinctions derived from the "contemporary or
then recent history," which had condemned the earlier English
practices of using writs of assistance and general warrants.
Writs of assistance arbitrarily gave officials great discretion to
search for smuggled goods 133 and general warrants, which
similarly allowed officials to search for private papers. 134 The
Court stated that these oppressive practices "were in the
minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, and were considered sufficiently explanatory of
what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures. "135
The Court proceeded to link the Fourth Amendment to
trespass law. It quoted Lord Camden, who had authored English opinions celebrated by both the English and the colonists. 136 In these opinions liberty meant having secure property interests. 137 According to the Court, Lord Camden stat132

See, e.g., Lipkin, supra note 23, at 368 n.l59 (stating that "[i)f originalism
contends that it is the correct methodology because the Framers intended it to
be, the argument is circular;" adding that even if the Constitution contained a
clause that the "Framer's intent should control," the clause would still be subject
to different interpretations, one linked to nontextaul arguments, such as "the
correct political theory"). With a different casting of history, Professor White,
however, can envision history as an interpretative "restraint:"
One might argue that with the loss of objectivity there is nothing to
prevent present actors from creating their own versions of history, designed to conform to or reinforce their contemporary agendas. But that
argument is itself modernist-inspired. It proceeds from a conception of
time as segmented, in which actors in the "present" have a discretely
different experience and set of attitudes from actors in the past, and
more fundamentally, in which actors in the present are capable of overwhelming or wholly erasing their past. . . . [C)ontemporaries, [however,)
cannot escape the set of attitudes and experiences that defmes their existence as occupants of a particular moment in time.
See White, supra note 69, at 619-20. This type of "restraint," however, has not lead
to a uniform construction of history, as well explained by Professor White, as he
examined the different constructions of history by critical legal scholars and
"originalists." White, supra note 69, at 580-96.
133
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
•u ld. at 626.
135
Id. at 626-27.
136
ld. at 626.
137
Id. at 627 (quoting Camden as stating that the "'great end for which men
entered into society was to secure their property' and that even the 'bruising the
grass' may be a trespass if a person offers no justification") (citation omitted).

2002]

"SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

481

ed, "[p]apers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his
dearest property."138 Although Camden declared that the
"eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass,"139 the compulsory production of papers is like the
"[b]reaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers." 140
The Boyd Court thus viewed the Fourth Amendment as protecting "sacred right"141 of property, which also encompassed
"personal security and personalliberty."142
After Boyd, the Court continued to interpret the Fourth
Amendment through the lens of property law. 143 Yet, when
trespass law did not address the government's access to intangible information, such as telephone conversations, the Court
in Olmstead v. United States 144 had to decide whether wire
tapping constituted a "search" or "seizure" protected by the
Fourth Amendment. In 1928, with the Court's property perspective of the Fourth Amendment, it held that tapping telephone conversations did not constitute a "search" or "seizure."145
To justify its interpretation, the Court viewed the language of the Fourth Amendment to indicate no protection
because it listed "material things-the person, the house, his
papers, or his effects."146 The Warrant Clause, the Court
added, similarly referred to tangibles capable of being seized.
In addition, officials installed the wire taps without trespassing on the criminal defendants' property, 147 and they acquired evidence "by the use of the sense of hearing and that

138

I d. at 627-28.
Id. at 628.
140
ld. at 630.
U1 Id.
U2 Id.
143
Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 314-20 (1998); Cloud, supra
note 118, at 581.
144
277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
146
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
146
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
147
ld. at 457.
139
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only."148 For the Court, it could not "enlarge[]" the language
of the Fourth Amendment to "forbid hearing or sight. "149
To further support its holding, the Court stated that
officials' of violations of trespass laws may not be sufficient to
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 150 It cited a prior decision
in which it had held that viewing activities in an open field,
even if accomplished by a trespass, did not constitute a
"search of person, house, papers, or effects. "151
For its interpretive grounding, the Olmstead Court also
quoted a passage from the 1925 decision of Carroll v. United
States, 152 the same passage that the modern Court had repeatedly quoted, 153 paraphrased 154 or distorted. 155 "The

"" ld. at 464.
"" ld. at 465.
1150 ld.
151
Id (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
152
267 u.s. 132 (1925).
153
See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (authored by Justice
Thomas).
164
See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (authored by Justice
Thomas) (stating that "'[a)lthough the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable,' New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985), our effort to give content to this term may be guided
by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment").
155
See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (authored
by Justice Souter) (stating that "[i]n reading the Amendment, we are guided by
'the traditional protections, against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded
by the common law at the time of framing,' Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,
931 (1995) . . . since '[a]n examination of the common-law understanding of an
officer's authority to arrest sheds light on the obviously relevant, if not entirely
dispositive consideration of what the Framers of the Amendment might have
thought to be unreasonable,' Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980)"). In
Atwater, Justice O'Connor dissented, allowing Justice Souter the opportunity to
criticize her for not invoking her prior practice of using the common law to assess
reasonableness. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345 n._14. Justice O'Connor previously dissented from the Court's rejection of the common-law rule that allowed officers to
shoot fleeing felons. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (authored by
Justice Scalia) (stating that "we inquire first whether the action was regarded as
an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed. . . . Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search
or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness. . . ."); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (authored by Justice Scalia) (stating that "where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the
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Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted[,] and in a manner which will conserve public interests, as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."156 Although the Court did not elaborate on the significance of common law, it did state that the language of the
Fourth Amendment acted as a restraint.
It then offered a perspective that it would later discard
under a different Fourth Amendment paradigm: "The
reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument . . . intends to project his voice to those"
outside his house. 157 In contrast, Justice Brandeis in his dissent rejected this construction, inviting the Court to interpret
the Fourth Amendment with an appreciation of the
government's growing investigative capacities. 158 He invoked
the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, exclaiming "[w]e
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding,"15g,a malleable statement that ironically permits both
broad and narrow interpretations of the Constitution. 160 In
type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional proVISion was enacted,
whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard 'is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests"' (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989), which quoted Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 654 (1979)). But see Wyoming v. Hougton, 526 U.S. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[t)o my knowledge, we have never restricted ourselves to
a two-step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and governmental
interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law 'yields no
answer"').
158
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
149 (1925)).
167
ld. at 466.
158
ld. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
169
Id. at 472 (quoting M'Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)).
160
Supreme Court Justices have often quoted this famous phrase from
M'Culloch, sometimes to limit the government's power and liability and sometimes
to expand the government's power and liability. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706,807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting constitutional sovereign immunity for states in state courts and declaring that since M'Culloch the "Court
has repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various clauses
of [the Constitution), over objects of which the Fathers could not have dreamed");
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (stating that "only the
most egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional
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his dissent, Justice Brandeis looked to Marshall's words to
underscore the need to apply the Fourth Amendment to contexts not imaginable in 1791: "Clauses guaranteeing to the
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must
have a similar capacity to adaptation to a changing
world." 161
This property-based perspective of the Fourth Amendment
thus raised property-framed issues: whether the government
had searched and seized a tangible item, whether an "area"
had constitutional protection, 162 and if so, whether the governmental officials trespassed by "physical invasion." As time
passed, the Court's property-framed issues were sometimes
dispositive 163 and sometimes merely relevant. 164 The

sense'") (citation omitted); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332, (1986) (Justice
Rehnquist's opinion holding that negligent governmental conduct does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment and stating that "[o)ur Constitution deals with
the larger concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to
supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability
for injuries that attend living together in society"); Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 188 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating "[T)he Court's contention
that, because a field is not a house or effect, it is not covered by the Fourth
Amendment is inconsistent with [precedent) . . . and with the understanding of
the nature of constitutional adjudication from which it derives"); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 758-59 (1982) (Burger, J., concurring) (deriving absolute immunity for presidential actions from the "constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers" and stating that "[c)onstitutional adjudication often bears unpalatable
fruit"); Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
and dissenting) (inviting the Court to consider the "real world" of racial discrimination and explaining that "[i)n order to treat some people equally, we must treat
them differently"); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 732 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing for a broader definition of liberty or property under the Fourteenth
Amendment to safeguard a person's interest in reputation).
181
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472.
162
See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (stating that
warrantless use of a spike microphone was unconstitutional, not because of trespass law, but rather because of "the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area").
163
See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962) (stating that prison
cell is not a constitutionally protected area because it "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room"); On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (stating that "no trespass had been committed" by officers using concealed microphone while in defendant's laundry).
184
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963) (refusing
to distinguish between "verbal evidence" and the "more common tangible fruits of
[an) unwarranted intrusion"); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (stating that the "deci-
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Court's shifting emphasis of issues allowed the property-based
foundation to slowly crack.
This movement is discernible by comparing the Court's
1942 decision in Goldman v. United States 165 with its 1961
decision in Silverman v. United States. 166 In Goldman, the
Court relied on Olmstead to exclude oral statements from
protection when officials, without a warrant, gathered information by using a listening device attached to a wall, but in
Silverman granted protection to oral statements when officials, also without a warrant, used a microphone to puncture a
baseboard and listen. 167 In both cases, the Court refused to
overrule Omstead, 168 but in Silverman, the Court's language
reflected the tension in its constructed property foundation; it
declared, "Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real
property law." 169 The Court, however, did not completely
discard history, but selected that part related to the home. It
noted the "long history"170 of protecting a person's interest in
the home, language that is also reflective of more modern decisions:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his
house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the
knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the
Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth
protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized soci-

sion here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as
a matter of local law"; determining technical intrusion of a "constitutionally protected area").
160
See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (holding that
Fourth Amendment not implicated by governmental officials' use of a device attached to a wall to listen to a conversation).
166
See, e.g., Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 (holding that officials' warrantless use
of a microphone with a foot-long spike to puncture a baseboard, allowing the
heating duct to act as "a conductor of sound," violated the Fourth Amendment).
167 ld.
188
ld. at 508 (determining no need to re-examine Olmstead in "light of recent
and projected developments in the science of electronics"); Goldman, 316 U.S. at
136 (stating that reconsideration of Olmstead "would serve no good purpose").
169
Id. at 511.
uo Id.
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ety must provide some oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate
place which is a man's castle. 171
Recognizing its incremental changes, the Silverman Court
stated, "We find no occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but
we decline to go beyond it, even by a fraction of an inch. "172
Later the Court would look at these cases and others, 173
stating that they had "eroded"174 a property foundation for the
Fourth Amendment. 175 In a series of three decisions issued in
1967-Warden v. Hayden/ 16 Berger v. New York/77and Katz
v. United States, 118-the Court looked back and viewed the
foundation with a different perspective: the Fourth Amendment
also protects an individual's interest in privacy. 179 In charac-

171

ld. at 511 n.4 (quoting United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d
Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), affd, On Lee v. United States, 342 U.S. 941
(1952).
172
ld. at 512.
173
See, e.g., Warden, 387 U.S. at 305 (stating that "[i)n determining whether
someone is a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' we have refused 'to import into the law . . . subtle distinctions, developed and refmed by
the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical'") (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960)); id.
at 305-06 (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) for its suppression of
stolen goods which at common law could have been seized); id. at 305 (declaring
that "[t)he development of search and seizure law . . . is replete with examples of
the transformation in substantive law brought about through the interaction of
the felt need to protect privacy from unreasonable invasions and the flexibility in
rulemaking made possible by the remedy of exclusion") (emphasis added).
174
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (stating that later cases have "negated" statements
in Olmstead "that a conversation passing over a telephone wire cannot be said to
come within the Fourth Amendment's enumeration of 'persons, houses, papers,
and effectsm).
175
See, e.g., Warden, 387 U.S. at 304 (stating that the "premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited").
176
387 u.s. 294 (1967).
177
388 u.s. 41 (1967).
178
389 u.s. 347 (1967).
179
In cases decided before 1967, the Court also referred to the Fourth
Amendment's protection of privacy. For example, in 1949, the Court, in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), described the "security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusions by the police" to be "implicit in the concept of ordered tiber-
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terizing its decisions as a "shift in emphasis from property to
privacy,"180 the Court did not completely abandon historical
perspectives of property. 181 Instead, it sought to bring privacy
interests into the forefront, a move that both afforded governmental officials greater investigative means and gave individuals "the remedy of suppression."182

B. Reconfiguring the Fourth Amendment's Foundation:
Protecting Society's Interest in Privacy
Although the Court decided numerous Fourth Amendment
cases in 1967/83 several decisions highlighted privacy as an

ty." Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28 (emphasis added) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325, (1937)). Similarly in 1961, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), referred to "the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy." Mapp, 367
U.S. at 655. It also quoted Boyc£s reference to the Fourth Amendment protecting
"the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." ld. at 646 (emphasis
added) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
180
Warden, 387 U.S. at 304.
181
See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 & 41 (1988) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit "the warrantless search and seizure
of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home," which was an "area
accessible to the public"); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987)
(relying on the 1924 case of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) to aid
it in creating four factors to defme what kind of an area represents "curtilage," a
common law construction to grant the area around the home the "same protection
under the law of burglary": "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to
the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and the steps taken by
the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by"); Dow
Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236, 237-38 (1986) (stating that area
surrounding a large industrial complex "can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere
between 'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking the critical characteristics of both,"
but recasting these property questions under the umbrella of society's "privacy"
expectations).
182
Warden, 387 U.S. at 307 (stating that suppression, "which made possible
protection of privacy from unreasonable searches without regard to proof of a
superior property interest, likewise provides the procedural device necessary for
allowing otherwise peimissible searches and seizures conducted solely to obtain
evidence of a crime").
183
See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (establishing Fourth
Amendment standard for administrative health and safety inspections of the
home). In Camara, the Court recognized privacy associated with one's home:
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell
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interest protected by the Fourth Amendment: Warden v.
Hayden/ 84 Berger v. New York/ 85 and, most intensely, Katz
v. United States. 186ln these three cases, the Court lifted privacy strands from prior cases and highlighted them, thus allowing the Fourth Amendment to apply to some police practices
that previously would not have been a "search." The Court
recharacterized some older cases, which focused on property
concepts, to symbolize the Fourth Amendment's protection for
an individual's interest in privacy, 187 and it overruled some
prior cases, 188 characterizing them as lacking a privacy focus.
Yet, the Court's construction and application of its privacy
standard has also resulted in many police practices not being
"searches."
In Warden v. Hayden, 189 the Court explicitly rejected a
property focus for the Fourth Amendment as it strengthened
the power of the government to gather information leading to

in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government or enforcement agent.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 529 (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948)); see also See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (concluding
"that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution
or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure").
1
.. 387 u.s. 294 (1967).
185
388 u.s. 41 (1967).
186
389 u.s. 347 (1967).
187
See generally Clancy, supra note 143, at 329 (stating that "after adopting
privacy as the measure of the individual's interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment, the Court had to retrofit its prior case law to coincide with it.").
186
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (concluding that
"the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine can no longer be regarded as controlling"); Warden, 387 U.S. at 300, 309-10 (rejecting prior case law distinction between the government's seizing "mere evidence" and the government's seizing
"instrumentalities, fruits or contraband"), overruling Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that "I join the opinion of the Court because at long last is
overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. United States, . . . and its offspring and brings
wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping fully within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment.").
189
387 u.s. 294 (1967).

2002]

"SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

489

conviction. It stated, "The premise that property interests control the right of the government to search and seize has been
discredited. "190 To give police officers a bigger investigative
power, the Court discarded prior decisions/91 which had limited authority to search and seize contraband, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime. Older cases considered what kind of property officials could search and seize. With the prior case law
having this property focus, the Court and the dissene 92 recast
the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, not property. It
explained, "Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to
a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an
instrumentality, fruit or contraband."193 The Court then proceeded to find the old property distinctions to be "wholly irrational" when considered from an individual's interest in privacy.194
With a privacy perspective highlighted in Warden, the
Court continued discussing privacy in Berger, but ironically
concluded with the property language of its prior cases, stating
that a state statute unconstitutionally "permit[ted] a trespassory invasion of the home [and] office."195 Berger declared unconstitutional a state statute that failed to limit electronic

1110

Warden, 387 U.S. at 304.
Id. at 306 (stating the "premise in Gouled [v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921)] that government may not seize evidence simply for the purpose of proving
crime has likewise been discredited"). The Court also stated that even though
Congress abided by Gouled's property distinctions, it found such adherence "attributable more to chance than considered judgment." Id. at 308.
192
Id. at 313 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas had authored two years
earlier Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which he articulated a
right to privacy arising from the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. Griswold, 381
U.S. at 484. In considering the emanations from the Fourth Amendment, he cited
Boyd's reference to the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." I d.
(citation omitted). He also discerned the emanation by considering the Court's
earlier reference to the "Fourth Amendment as creating a 'right to privacy."' I d.
at 485 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)). When considering the
mere evidence rule in Warden, Justice Douglas similarly reaffirmed his perspective that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy. Warden, 387 U.S. at 312-15.
He referred to Lord Camden's decision of 1765 as establishing a "zone of privacy
which no governmental official may enter." Id. at 314-15 (citation omitted).
193
Warden, 387 U.S. at 302.
UM Id.
190
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967).
191
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eavesdropping. 196 The Court explicitly held that the electronic
capturing of a conversation was a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 197 It viewed prior precedent as
having "negated" its holding in Olmstead that a wiretap of a
telephone line from a home was not a "search. "198 Even
though it briefly concluded using its old property-based perspective, mentioning "trespassory invasion," 199 it repeatedly
characterized the Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy. 200
The Court declared, "It is now well settled that 'the Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States. "201 It also described the "'core of the
Fourth Amendment'" as protecting the '"security of one's privacy .'"202 In addition, it also referred to an interest mentioned in
older decisions, but one not moved to the forefront: an
individual's interest in "security. "203
198

Berger, 388 U.S. at 44.
Id. at 51.
198 Id.
199
Id. at 64.
200
Id. at 49. The Court quoted the famous passage from Boyd, which quoted
Lord Camden to construct a view of framers' intent:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of
the case . . . they apply to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privac~s of
life.
ld. at 49 (emphasis added) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)
(quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765)); see also id. at 63
(stating that "[t)his is no formality that we require today but a fundamental rule
that has long been recognized as basic to the privacy of every home in America")
(emphasis added); id. at 62 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441
(1963), "the fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitutes
a great danger to the privacy of the individual") (emphasis added); id. at 56 (citing
prior precedent for recognizing that a recording constituted "an invasion of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis added).
201
Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
202
Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)). Older decisions also
mentioned privacy, but not as the means of defining a Fourth Amendment search.
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (stating that "[w)hen
the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to
be decided by a judicial officer, not by policeman or government enforcement
agent.").
200
Berger, 388 U.S. at 53 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967)). In Camara, the Court stated that the "basic purpose of this Amendment,
197
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In its seminal decision in Katz v. United States/04 the
Court-in five opinions205-explicitly acknowledged a shift in
paradigms for interpreting what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search." At issue was governmental officials' attachment
of an "electronic listening and recording device to the outside of
a public telephone booth."206 In writing for the Court, Justice
Stewart discarded the "'trespass' doctrine" from Olmstead and
Goldman 207 and stated that the "Fourth Amendment protects
people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches
and seizures."208 The Court held that the officials had conducted a Fourth Amendment "search. "209 In doing so, the
Court looked to modern practices in examining the technology
at issue-telephones. The Court stated, "To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public
telephone has come to play in private communication. "210
The Court found unhelpful how the parties had framed the
"search" issues: "[w]hether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area" and whether "physical penetration of
a constitutionally protected area" is necessary for the Court to
hold that a "search" occurred. 211 A "search" had occurred because Katz, in using the telephone, had shut the door behind

as recognized by countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."
Camara, 387 U.S. at 528.
2
. . 389 u.s. 347 (1967).
205
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967). Justice Stewart authored
the opinion for the Court, which all Justices joined except dissenting Justice
Black. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. (Justice Marshall did not participate in the decision). Three justices wrote concurring opinions (Douglas, joined by Justice
Brennan, White and Harlan); these opinions in part disagreed as to whether the
Fourth Amendment had a "national security" exception to the warrant requirement, an issue not before the Court but mentioned and left unresolved by Justice
Stewart. ld. at 358-64. Justice Harlan's concurrence articulated a standard for
defining a Fourth Amendment "search" later adopted by a majority of the Court.
ld. at 361; see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (applying
Harlan's two-part inquiry for a Fourth Amendment "search").
206
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
201
ld. at 353.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210
Id. at 352.
211
!d. at 349, 353.
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him, excluding the "uninvited ear."212 The Court articulated a
theory that questioned whether the person had "exposed" the
information: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even it his own home or office, is not subject of Fourth Amendment protection. "213
When defining a "search" from this reference, Justice Stewart distinguished between two types of privacy: "a general right
of privacy" and a privacy interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment. The Court stated that "the protection of a person's
general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is like the protection of his property and of his very life,
largely left to the law of the individual States."214 The Fourth
Amendment, in contrast protected "privacy," as well as other
interests. 215 As an example, Justice Stewart offered that a
person has a Fourth Amendment interest in property, whether
officials seize it publicly or privately. 216
In elaborating on this new "search" doctrine, Justice
Harlan in a concurrence articulated the modern Court's
"search" inquiry: whether the person had a subjective expectation of privacy and whether this expectation is "one that society
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'~ 17 He did not, however, discard examining the "place" under consideration. He explained that a person's "home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy."218 In addition, he recast the physical penetration inquiry to include "electronic invasion,"219
stating that requiring "physical penetration" is "bad physics as
well as bad law. "220
In contrast, Justice Black's dissent reflected prior case law
and a different role for the Court. 221 Not only did he not want

212
213

2

"

215

218
217
21s
219
220

221

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id.
ld.

at 352.
at 351.
at 350.
at 350 n.4.
at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
at 360.
at 364-74 (Black, J., dissenting).
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to discard precedent, 222 but he could not create a construction
of the word "search" to include electronic eavesdropping. 223 He
sarcastically accused the Court of preferring "philosophical
discourses" to the mundane task of reading the words of the
Fourth Amendment. 224 In addition, he constructed a framer's
intent argument to exclude this modern practice, noting that
the framers had not prohibited general eavesdropping. 225 He
rejected the need to "rewrite the Amendment in order 'to bring
it into harmony with the times.'"226
In examining telephone technology, the majority and the
dissent in Katz faced the same interpretive task: how to apply
the Fourth Amendment to a practice not explicitly addressed by
the text, one that did not exist at the time of the framing, and
one inconsistently addressed by precedent. In time, the Court
adopted Justice Harlan's two-part standard for a "search," yet
one could only know the meaning of the standard through the
Court's application of it. The progeny of Katz fails to provide a
coherent framework for predicting when an activity is a
"search," just as a postmodernist would expect. The progeny
does reveal, however, the Court's rhetorical flourishes upon the
privacy theme established in Katz.
Ill. COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY

Since Katz v. United States, the Court has decided numerous cases revealing its varied conceptions of privacy. The
Court's decisions sometimes have clear boundaries, but mostly
what privacy means is still uncertain for a variety of reasons.
Advances in technology often invite the Court to draw analogies from one investigative practice to another one. An analogy
by definition is an inexact comparison, allowing the analyst to

= Id.

at 367-72.
Id. at 364-65.
224
Id. at 365.
225
Id. at 366. He explained that the framers were "no doubt aware" of the
practice of eavesdropping, "and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use
of evidence obtained by eavesdropping . . . they would have used the appropriate
language to do so in the Fourth Amendment." I d.
228
Id. at 364.
223
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see both similarities and dissimilarities. Depending upon
whether the analyst emphasizes a dissimilarity or a similarity,
the application is often uncertain. Privacy is also a shifting
ground in society, one that eludes sharp characterization. As
Professors Wayne LaFave and Tony Amsterdam have noted,
deciding what constitutes a "search" is simply a "value judgment," one considering whether a particular police practice is
"inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. "227 By
highlighting those cases in which the Court considered new
technology, we can discern the Court's rhetorical devices for
labeling activities as implicating privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment. In doing so, we are able to view the
Court's recent decision in Kyllo v. United States as meandering
down another new road, but one not labeled by the Court.
Even though the Court has thematically described its
"search" jurisprudence as protecting an individual's interest in
privacy, the privacy theme masks the Court's numerous rhetorical devices for deciding cases, devices that give the Court great
flexibility in deciding whether a "search" occurred. In examining new technology, the Court constructed the relationship
between privacy and technology using several rhetorical devices: (1) declaring a police investigative practice to be sui generis,
in a class by itself, because it was so nominally intrusive; (2)
characterizing public and private disclosure as clearly discemible acts (i.e, not viewing privacy as being on a continuum or
representing a normative judgment); (3) distinguishing between
different types of sensory enhancement devices, with visual
surveillance and olfactory enhancement, affording officials
greatest freedom from restraints by the Fourth Amendment,
but with non-enhanced, basic physical touch often implicating
the Fourth Amendment.

227

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
§ 2.l(d), at 393 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385 (1974)).
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A. Sui Generis Investigative Activity: Not a "Search"
In United States v. Place, 228 the Court held that no
"search" occurred because officers used nominally intrusive
technology-a canine sniff for drugs-to gather incriminating
information. 229 Instead of holding that the dog sniff was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, 230 the Court declared
the practice to be unique, in a class of its own, one not even
implicating the Fourth Amendment. 231 In doing so, the Court
created a special category for an investigative practice. The
Court first envisioned only one type of investigative practice
deserving of the label sui generis-a canine sniff of luggage for
drugs. 232 In time, analogy allowed the Court in United States
v. Jacobsen 233 to extend the "no search" label to another nominally intrusive practice-field testing of a white powder to determine if it were cocaine. 234 With two types of technological activities falling within the class, the Jacobsen Court did not
label field testing to be sui generis; reasoning by analogy was
sufficient for the Court. (Despite the Court's categorization,
another rhetorical device would still allow the Court a way out
from its "no search" conclusion-factual distinctions from case to
case.)
In two cases, Place and the recent decision of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 235 the Court determined that dog sniffs
were not "searches" under the facts of the cases. 236 Although

462 u.s. 696, 707 (1983).
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
230
Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun labeled the Court's "no search" determination to be dicta, but hypothesized that "a
dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified ... [by) reasonable suspicion." Id. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
231
Id. at 707.
212
Id. The Court stated, "We are aware of no other investigatory procedure
that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in
the content revealed by the procedure." I d.
m 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
214
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984).
2
.. 531 u.s. 32 (2001).
238
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); Place, 462 U.S. at
707.
228

228
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the Court's determinations in both cases were dicta, the decisions cited two aspects relevant for its conclusion: the nominal
intrusion by the dog's sniffing and the limited disclosure of
information. 237
In Place, a dog sniffed an airline passenger's luggage; officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the passenger was
carrying illegal narcotics, which according to the Court, allowed
the officers to briefly detain the passenger. Before concluding
that the sniff of luggage was not a search, the Court made the
following comment: "Obviously, if this investigative procedure
is itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of
[the passenger's] luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to the
sniff test-no matter how brief-could not be justified on less
than probable cause."238 One may infer from this statement
that the Court may have seemed constrained by its prior
search jurisprudence and that one way out was to declare a
sniff not to be a search. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring
opinion in the judgment, drew that inference, stating that the
Court could have labeled the sniff to be a search, but one justified by reasonable suspicion, not necessarily requiring probable
cause. 239 Instead, the Court created a special category for dog
sniffs because "this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search>724° and because the sniff produced a
"limited disclosure. "241 In concluding, the Court also wove in
the facts of the case; the sniff was a luggage "located in a public place. >724 2
When the context shifted to sniffing the "exterior" of cars,
the Court in City of Indianapolis cited Place to support its

~· 7

Edrrwnd, 531 U.S. at 53; Place, 462 U.S. at 707. In Place, the Court determined that officers unreasonably seized an airline passenger's luggage for ninety
minutes while waiting to have a dog sniff it. Place, 462 U.S. at 710. In City of
Indianapolis, the Court held that if the primary purpose of a roadblock was to
search for drugs it was unconstitutional, but that walking a dog around an illegally stopped car did "not transform the seizure [of the car and person) into a
search." Edrrwnd, 531 U.S. at 40.
~.. Place, 462 U.S. at 706.
~•• Id. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
:uo Id. at 707.
ut Id.
wId.
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conclusion that no "search" occurred. 243 Even though the
Court held that roadblocks primarily designed to detect illegal
drugs violated the Fourth Amendment, 244 the Court in a single paragraph disposed of the dog-sniffing issue. 245 In contrast, the dissent in City of Indianapolis viewed the majority as
relying on the officials' use of drug-detecting dogs to give the
roadblocks an unconstitutional primary purpose. 246 For the
majority, the dogs were irrelevant because the sniffs were not
searches.
The Court also extended the dog-sniff analysis to the chemical testing for drugs in United States v. Jacobsen. 247 Officers
examined white powder in clear bags that Federal Express
employees discovered while opening a damaged package. The
officers used three test tubes to determine if the powder was
cocaine. The Court explained that "[w]hen a substance containing cocaine is placed in one test tube after another, it will
cause liquids to take on a certain sequence of colors."248 Again
the Court cited the dual rationale of Place-a nominally invasive procedure with limited disclosure. 249 For the Court, the
testing did not compromise "any legitimate interest in privacy"
because it only told the officers one fact-whether the substance
was cocaine. 250 In justifying its conclusion, the Court noted
that the test would not disclose whether the white powder was
"sugar or talcum powder."251 In contrast, the dissent disagreed with the Court's "unbounded analysis," fearing that the
Court was "redefm[ing] the term 'search' to exclude a broad

... City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 40.
,... Id. at 42.
240
ld. at 40.
248
Id. at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting because the roadblocks
"serve the State's accepted and significant interests of preventing drunken driving
and checking for driver's licenses and vehicle registrations, and because there is
nothing in the record to indicate that the addition of the dog sniff lengthens
these otherwise legitimate seizures").
247
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-25 (1984).
248
Id. at 111 n.l.
••• Id. at 122-24.
250
Id.
251
Id. at 122.
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class of surveillance techniques. "252 In the end, the dissent
did, however, agree that the testing did not implicate privacy
because the owner had not hidden the powder in a "transparent pharmaceutical vial" to make it look like "legitimate medicine."253 The dissent thus sought to focus on context to determine a search rather than the unique but limited testing procedure.
With the creation of a special category for dog sniffs, the
Jacobsen Court thus expanded this category to include field
testing for the presence of cocaine. In a related contest, the
Court, again in dicta, suggested that another nominally intrusive and limited disclosure test might be valid pursuant to a
lawful investigative stop-fingerprinting suspects in the
field. 254 In Hayes v. Florida, 255 the Court explicitly left open
whether officers who have reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity may fingerprint suspects during a brief detention. Although the Court did not discuss the issue under its search
doctrines, 256 one may construct a parallel between Jacobsen's
field drug-testing and field fingerprinting.
This categorical exclusion is just one rhetorical device for
quickly ending Fourth Amendment analysis. Another rhetorical
device has involved the Court's dichotomy between what is
"private" and what is "public." Instead of describing privacy as
falling on a broad continuum, the Court has created another
category in which technological activities are surprisingly (depending on one's perspective) not "searches."
B. Using Technology to Get Information from Trusted

Third Parties: Not a "Search"
The Katz Court also stated that no "search" occurs when
individuals "expose" information to the public. 257 In applying
this strand of Katz, the Court constructed a rigid dichotomy

252
253

254
256
256

257

Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
ld. at 142.
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985).
Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816.
Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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between private and public information, instead of viewing
personal information as possessing different degrees of privacy.
Under the Court's dichotomous construction, a person who
reveals information to a trusted third-party has exposed that
information to the "public."258 If the third-party then violates
the confidence and gives officials the information, no "search"
occurred because the individual "exposed" the information to
the "public" by informing the trusted third person. The significance to this private and public dichotomy emerges when officials used technology to gather such "exposed" information to
third parties. A case representing this construction of privacy is
Smith v. Maryland/ 59 a case ironically relied on by the modern Court in Kyllo v. United States, 260a case reaching a different conclusion by using different rhetorical constructions.
In Smith, officials used a "pen register" to record the local
numbers that Smith had dialed from his home. 261 Officials
had asked a telephone company to install the device in its
facility, not in Smith's home. 262 The device worked by recording the "electrical impulses" Smith made by dialing. 263 The
Court applied Harlan's two-part inquiry in Katz and also relied
on "search" cases decided before Katz. 264 The Court held that
no "search" occurred265 when officials used this device to learn

258

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 u.s. 435, 443 (1976).
... 442 u.s. 735 (1979).
260
533 U.S. 27 (2001) (citing case to explain its conclusion that a "search" occurred); Kyllo, 533 u:s. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing case to explain his
conclusion that no "search" occurred). For a discussion of Kyllo, see infra text in
Part IV.
261
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737-38.
282
ld. at 737.
263
Id. at 736 n.l.
2
~~< Id. at 739-40. The Court looked to cases in which the individual had told
personal information to a "friend," who turned out to be an undercover official or
an informant. ld. at 743-44 (citations omitted). The "friend," using technology,
then transmitted the statements to others or recorded them. In these cases, the
Court held before Katz that no "search" had occurred. See, e.g., Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (secretly using electronic equipment to record conversation); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (using radio equipment to
transmit conversations).
266
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
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which local numbers Smith had dialed.
In applying the two-part inquiry, the Smith Court made
several observations about the Katz standard. The Court explained that the first question-a person's subjective expectation
of privacy-may at times need to be replaced by a "normative
inquiry."266 Such circumstances, "where subjective expectations could play no meaningful role," according to the Court,
would exist if the government had announced on television that
no privacy existed or where a person had been conditioned by a
"totalitarian country;" the normative question of "this nations
traditions" would instead be considered. 267 The circumstances
of this case, for the Court, did not raise this normative question. The Court also narrowly interpreted the second question-whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy
by characterizing the homeowner as voluntarily disclosing his
telephone numbers to the public, even though the disclosure
was to the telephone company for a "limited purpose."268
Third, the Court also considered whether telephone companies
had "routinely used" this technology. 269 In doing so, the Court
characterized the issue of routine use in two contrasting
ways-it considered both actual practices 270 and potential practices by telephone companies. 271 Fourth, the Court characterized the disclosure as limited, noting that the pen register
would not even indicate whether a conversation had actually
occurred. 272 And most important, the Court framed the privacy issue as an interest in the numbers dialed, not in the activity conducted in privacy of one's home. 273
As characterized by the Smith Court, the homeowner had
neither a subjective, nor a reasonable, expectation of privacy
"that the numbers ... dial[ed] will [be kept] secret."274 To

266

Id.
Id.
266
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
••• Id.
••• Id.

at 740 n.5.
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at
at
at
at
at
at
at

744 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
742.
742-43.
745.
741-42.
742.
743.
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rebut his asserted subjective expectation of privacy, the Court
cited both a Baltimore and District of Columbia telephone directory which informed subscribers that the phone company
can help in "identifying to the authorities the origin of unwelcome calls."275 This notice, for the Court, undermined a subjective expectation of privacy. Ironically, in addressing this
issue, the Court stated that subscribers "must convey numerical
information to the phone company."276 But later, in examining
the second issue of reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court
characterized the submission of numerical information as "voluntary;" Smith "voluntarily conveyed to [the telephone company] information that it had facilities for recording and that it
was free to record."277 One may try to reconcile the conflict by
stating that the Court only in dicta addressed the second issue
of a reasonable expectation of privacy, having determined that
Smith lacked a subjective expectation of privacy. Yet, this inconsistency highlights how the Court's constructions of "facts"
influence the outcome.
The Court also considered how telephone companies "routinely use0"278 pen registers under both Katz inquiries. Under
the subjective prong of Katz, routine use meant actual practices
of many telephone companies. The Court discerned routine use
of pen registers in "checking billing operations, detecting fraud,
and preventing violations of the law."279 Although the Court
did not identify which violations that companies routinely detected, it did declare that "most people . . . presumably have
some awareness of one common use: to aid in the identification
of persons making annoying or obscene calls."280 But when
considering the second issue, the Court looked to potential
practices-whether the telephone company could have used a
pen register to record local calls. 281 The Court refused to con-

275

Id.
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
278
Id.
(1977)).
280 ld.
281
ld.
276

at
at
at
at
at

742-43 (citations omitted).
743.
745.
742, 745.
742 (citing United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75

at 745.
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sidered whether the specific telephone company involved had a
practice of recording local calls. The Court attempted to justify
its reliance on potential practice by stating that to do otherwise
would be "to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment ...
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation."282 In
short, nationwide practices-actual and potential~ontributed
to determining that no "search" occurred.
The Court also viewed as undermining the homeowner's
subjective expectation of privacy the limited nature of the disclosure, an aspect also of the Court's sui generis no "search"
doctrine. 283 The Court determined that there was a constitutional difference between listening to the words of a conversation, as had occurred in Katz, and in learning the numbers the
homeowner dialed. The Court separated the words of a conversation from the ·numbers dialed, stating that "pen registers do
not acquire the contents of communications."284 With pen registers not even recording whether a conversation had occurred,
the Court concluded that the pen register had "limited capabilities. "285 In contrast, the dissents viewed individuals as having
a strong privacy interest in "avoid[irig] disclosure of their personal contacts. "286 The conflicting characterizations may in
part arise from the majority's dichotomous privacy approach
and the dissent viewing privacy as falling on a spectrum. 287
Significantly aiding the Court's no "search" determination
was its characterization of what activity was under consideration. For the majority, dialing from one's home was "immaterial for purposes of analysis in this case~8 because the telephone company could have gotten the same information if it
had used another person's telephone. The Court's privacy frame
was thus limited to revealing the numbers dialed, not what one

Id.
See supra notes 231-53 and accompanying text.
280
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
285
Id. at 742.
288
Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
287
Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated, "Privacy is not
a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all." Id.
288
Id. at 743.
280

283
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had done in his home. In contrast, a dissent invoked a broader
privacy frame that encompassed the officers' learning of what
the homeowner had done in his house. 289
By limiting the privacy issue to numbers dialed, the Court
was able to then characterize the homeowner as putting the
dialed numbers in the public arena. Here the Court relied on
cases decided before Katz to support its view of the privacy risk
analysis. Prior to Katz, the Court had determined that officials
may use technology to secretly record the exact words a person
states to them, even if the disclosure of the words would violate
a confidence. 290 Although these cases dealt with information
given to an undercover officer or informant, the Smith Court
extended this practice to the telephone company. 291
The Smith Court thus constructed a "search" doctrine that
allowed officials to gain access to information without any procedural steps, for the officials had not gotten a subpoena nor a
search warrant. 292 The telephone company's voluntary disclosure of information that it did not routinely collect did not
trouble the Court because it viewed the "numbers dialed" to be
in the public arena. Perhaps the Court was prescient, anticipating both the development and routine use of caller identification by the public, but at the time of Smith, recording local
numbers dialed was not routine. But more importantly, the
construction of the privacy issue itself-the numbers dialed
versus learning about activity in the home-foreshadowed the
Court's negative conclusion.
Since Smith, the Court has often decided that officials did
not conduct Fourth Amendment "searches" when using technol-

289

Id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 742 (citations omitted).
291
Id. at 744-45. Supporting its decision was a recent decision determining
that bank users had no reasonable expectations of privacy violated when banking
officials turn over records documenting personal transactions to officials. United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). Similar to the Smith decision, the
Court characterized the bank records as lacking privacy content: "checks are not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions." Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. It also similarly determined the depositor
had voluntarily "exposed" such information to the public, namely the banks' employees. ld.
292
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
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ogy to aid their senses. In a series of cases, the Court shifted
the rhetorical arguments to allow officials with broad investigative powers outside the restraints of the Fourth Amendment.

C. Using Technology to Enhance Officials' Senses:
Often Not a "Search"
In interpreting Katz, the Court has frequently determined
that no "search" occurred when officials used technology to aid
four of their senses in conducting investigations. The Court has
most narrowly interpreted Katz as applied to officials' use of
technology enhancing visual surveillance in public. In contrast,
the Court has at times broadly interpreted Katz when applied
to an investigative technique not involving technology-touch.
And as previously discussed, Katz held that a "search" occurred
when officials used technology to aid their listening to a conversation in a public telephone booth, and Place held that no
"search" occurred when officials used dogs to enhance their
ability to smell drugs in luggage. In these opinions, the Court
has frequently cited Katz and its progeny in contrasting and
conflicting ways. In the end, what constitutes a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" is a fact-driven question, one allowing
the Court to use a variety of rhetorical constructions to characterize whether officials used technology to infringe constitutionally protected privacy.
When applying the Katz standard to officials' use of technology to aid vision, the Court has looked to cases decided long
before Katz articulated its "public exposure" doctrine: "What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even if in his own
home or office, is not subject of Fourth Amendment protection. "293 For example, in deciding that no search occurred
when officers used a flashlight to look inside a car at night, 294
the Court cited a 1927 decision, that examined officials' use of
a "searchlight" to gaze onto the deck of a boat. 295 It did not

293

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983); see also United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1987) (holding no "search" when official shined flashlight into bam not within the home's curtilage).
295
Brown, 460 U.S. at 740 (citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563
2
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cite Katz for this holding, but it did cite Katz with regard to the
question whether officials conducted a "search" by bending
"down at an angle" to look inside the car. 296 The Court noted
that the "general public could peer into the interior of' the car;
thus no "search" occurred. 297
With this commonplace enhancement of vision not a
"search," the Court then extended the rationale to cases in
which fewer members of the public would be in a position to
observe what an individual wanted to keep private. In a series
of three cases, a majority of the Court held that no "search"
occurred when officials used airplanes 298 and a helicopterss
to put themselves in a position to see better, while sometimes
using sophisticated expensive equipment and sometimes just
using the naked eye. In deciding that no "search" had occurred,
the Court also discussed the particular area under surveillance,
without explicitly invoking the "constitutionally protected area"
language from its pre-Katz search paradigm.
In 1986, the Court decided the same day two cases--California v. Ciraolo and Dow Chemical v. United States. In
Ciraolo, officials used their "naked eye[s]"300 as they flew
1,000 feet above "a fence-in backyard within the curtilage of a
home" that appeared to contain marijuana; they also used a
"standard 35 mm camera" to photograph the area. 301 In Dow,
officials from the Environmental Protection Agency flew at an
altitude as low as 1,200 feet over a chemical plant, occupying
two thousand acres, and used a $22,000 mapping camera302
that allowed them to magnify pictures to discern "wires as
small as ~-inch in diameter."303 Three years later the fractured Court decided Florida v. Riley, in which officials flew 400

(1927)).
296
Id.
297 Id.
296
Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo,
476 u.s. 207 (1986).
299
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
300
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
301
Id. at 209.
302
Dow, 476 U.S. at 250 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 238.
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feet above "a partially covered greenhouse in a residential
backyard."804 No "search" occurred in any of these cases, but
for different reasons.
In all three cases, the Court discussed the area observed
and the privacy traditionally associated with it. In both Ciraolo
and Riley, officials flew over an area generally associated with
privacy-the curtilage. The Court characterized the privacy
associated with curtilage as limited because the "public" could
fly over the area and see what it contained. 305 Both decisions
found air travel and road travel to be similar and "routine": "In
an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable" to expect the public not to
view the curtilage. 306 The Court crafted a view of "public" exposure by considering whether a private person could have
flown over the area and looked at it. In addition, the Ciraolo
Court also hypothesized that from the ground some individuals
could have seen the plants: "a power company repair mechanic
on a pole"307 or a citizen "perched on top of a truck or a twolevel bus"308 could have looked over the ten-foot fence the
homeowner had erected to preserve privacy. For the Court,
officials simply used technology to put themselves in a "public"
thoroughfare-the air. 309 In an important concurring opinion,
Justice O'Connor added a gloss on what "public"meant, a view
also shared by four dissenters, 310 suggesting that regulations
promulgated by the Federal Aviation Agency do not define
what constitutes "public" exposure. Instead what is "public"
depends upon whether the public travels with "sufficiently
3
"'
306

Riley, 488 U.S. at 447-86 (plurality opinion).
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14 (stating that "[a]ny member of the public flying
in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers
observed").
306
ld. at 215; Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 (plurality) (quoting this passage from
California v. Ciraolo); id. at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
same passage).
307
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
308
Id. at 211.
309
Id. at 213 (stating that the "Fourth Amendment protection of the home has
never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares").
310
Riley, 488 U.S. at 461 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 467 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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regularity" at a particular altitude. 311 The Court also nominally added that the viewing was done in a "physically
nonintrusive manner"312 and did not reveal "intimate details"
associated with the home and curtilage. 313
In contrast, when the Court decided Dow Chemical, it had
an additional technological question before it-whether a search
occurred when officials used a sophisticated, expensive camera
used by mapmakers. 314 It also had to discuss whether state
trade secret laws, which might have barred private parties
from taking such pictures, aided the company's claim to privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Dow Court relied on
Ciraolo to justify officials' flying over the plant, but had to reconstruct what it meant by "public" access when state trade
laws may have barred private individuals from doing what the
government did. In its reconstruction, the Court instead focused on the kind of information gathered; it noted that photographs did not reveal "intimate details, "315 an aspect also only
briefly mentioned in its later Riley decision discussing the use
of a helicopter, but "central" to identifying what constitutes a
"curtilage."316 It also attempted to shift attention to the limited use of this camera to by raising the question of much more
sophisticated technology. It stated, "It may well be . . . that
311

ld. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Ciroolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (stating that "observations by officers ... took
place within public navigable airspace . . . in a physically noninstrusive manner");
see also Riley, 488 U.S. at 449 (plurality opinion) (characterizing Ciroolo as "reasoning . . . the home and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from inspection that involves no physical invasion").
113
Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (plurality) (stating that "no intimate details connected with the use of the home or [other parts of the) curtilage were observed, and
there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury").
at• The majority characterized the photographs created by the camera as "essentially like those commonly used in mapmaking." Dow Chemical v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986). The dissent not only specified how expensive
the camera was, but also labeled it as a "sophisticated aerial mapping camera."
Id. at 242, 250 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
318
Id. at 238.
ua United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (stating that the Court
has "identified the central component of [the curtilage) inquiry as whether the
area harbors the 'intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life."') (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1984), quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
112
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surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available in the public,
such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."317
It also refused to look to state law to resolve the constitutional privacy issue because, for the Court, to do so would be
similar to invoking state trespass laws to determine what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search. "318 The Court also
characterized the area viewed as one reflecting limited privacy
interests. 319 The Court explained, "We find it important that
this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home,
where privacy expectations are more heightened."320 (Yet, in
Ciraolo and Dow, officials viewed curtilage, but in those opinions, the Court emphasized different facts.)
The Court has also considered officials' enhancing their
visual surveillance from the ground by using a "beeper," a "radio transmitter, ... which emits periodic signals that can be
picked up by a radio receiver."321 In two cases, United States
v. Knotts 322 and United States v. Karo, 323 the Court held that
when officials surreptitiously installed a beeper on property
and used it to keep track of property hypothetically in public
view, they did not engage in a "search."324 Karo, however, did
hold that monitoring of a beeper in a home for "a significant
period" was a "search. "325
Although the Court decided Knotts even before it heard the
oral argument in Place, the decision resonates with the Court's
sui generis characterization it created for dog sniffs of property.326 In both Knotts and Place, the Court treated the use of a
311

Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 232. For a discussion of the Court's prior use of trespass law, see
supra text accompanying notes 136-71.
319
Dow, 476 U.S. at 236 (stating that the area is one "falling somewhere between 'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking some the critical characteristics of
both").
320
Id. at 237 n.4.
321
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
:122 460 u.s. 276 (1983).
323
468 u.s. 705 (1984).
s:u Karo, 468 U.S. at 715; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
... Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
328
For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 228-32,
318
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beeper and a drug-sniffing dog to be nominal additions to the
officials' investigative capacities. The Knotts Court characterized using a beeper as merely "augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon [officers] at birth," even though Knotts,
officers had to rely on the beeper because their naked eyes
failed them. 327 For the Knotts Court, a beeper was like the
searchlight it had considered in 1927; both the beeper and the
search light aided visual observation. 328 The beeper simply
allowed officials to keep their eye on the car they were following, one ·"exposed" to the public. This construction of "public"
assumes that officials and private individuals would be able to
follow a person traveling in a car, no matter how long the trip
may be. The Court crafted this as a "public" excursion by characterizing officials' use of the beeper as being efficient. 329 In
this decision, the Court did not ask whether the general public
used this technology; instead it viewed officers as simply keeping track of that which was already exposed to the public-the
car containing the property with a hidden beeper. 330
The Karo Court adhered to Knotts' construction of a beeper
as a minor sensory augmentation, but only to the point that
the object with the beeper was in the "public's" eye. In Karo,
officials monitored a beeper in a home for a lengthy period. 331
Here the Court drew the line-one surrounding the house. The
Court explained that because officials could not have seen inside the house during the extended monitoring of the beeper,
the use of the beeper in this context was a "search. "332 What
created a sharp division in the Court were different views concerning the monitoring of property after it left the house. For
the plurality, later monitoring was not tainted by the earlier
monitoring of the house; 333 for the dissent, the house monitor-

235-39.
127
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
128
Id. at 282-83 (citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927).
1129
Id. at 284 (stating that "[w)e have never equated police efficiency with
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now").
130
Id. at 285.
131
Karo, 468 U.S. 715.
112
Id.
131
Id. at 720 (stating that even if prior monitoring of "house or other place
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ing "told police that the container had left the area. "334
Under the Court's constructions of a Fourth Amendment
"search," officers thus gained broad investigative powers free
from Fourth Amendment constraints when the Court characterized information as already exposed to the public and when the
technology they used was to nominally aid their vision. In dramatic contrast to this jurisprudence is the Court's construction
of a Fourth Amendment "search" when officials used their basic
sense of touch. The Court explicitly recognized this sharp difference in Bond u. United States, 335 when it held that an official had conducted a Fourth Amendment "search" when he
"squeezed" a bus passenger's soft luggage located in the overhead storage space.
The Bond Court described the difference as one of degree:
"[P]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than
purely visual inspection."336 In considering whether the public
routinely handles another person's luggage when traveling, the
Court characterized the "public" exposure issue narrowly. The
question was not whether we have a reasonable expectation of
privacy that others will not handle our personal luggage, but
rather the more specific question of whether we reasonably
expect others to "squeeze" our luggage or to handle it in "an
exploratory manner."337 The manner in which the Court constructed the public exposure issue helped to determine its result. In addition, the Court also ironically cited Place, which
held that no "search" occurred when a dog sniffed a person's
luggage, for the proposition that "luggage" is an "effect" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 338 As a result, the
dissent aptly noted that one does not expect drug-sniffing dogs
hovering near luggage, 339 but a different doctrine created the

was" illegal, that monitoring did not lead officials to discover that the property
was now somewhere located in a warehouse).
su Id. at 733 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
335
529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000).
338
Bond, 529 U.S. at 337.
337
Id. at 338-39
338
Id. at 336-37; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
339
Bond, 529 U.S. at 341.
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no "search" conclusion in Place. 340
The Court also construed the public exposure doctrine as
providing broad protection in another way. Instead of questioning why the passenger had not used hardsided luggage, the
Court described the passenger as taking steps to protect privacy by using an "opaque" bag. 341 Yet in an older case, California v. Greenwood, when officials rummaged through opaque
bags on the front lawn of a homeowner, the examining of the
"trash" was not a Fourth Amendment search. 342 Even though
the Court had in a prior decision refused to create a doctrinal
distinction based on "worthy" and "unworthy" containers, 343
the Court instead relied on its third-party disclosure cases and
focused on the location of the garbage to justify its no "search"
determination. 344 After the homeowner "voluntarily" placed
the bags outside the curtilage, the trash collector was free to
alter his routine way of collecting trash in order to separate the
homeowner's trash from everyone else's. 345 The Court did not
require the trash collector to act "routinely." For the Court, the
homeowner "exposed" his stuff hidden in an opaque bag to the
"public" by exposing it to the trash collector and "animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public. "346
In contrast, the dissent discemed a clear reasonable expectation of privacy in the opaque bags. According to the dissent,
"Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to commonly accepted
notions of civilized behavior."347
In describing what constitutes a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" after Katz, the Court has thus used a variety of rhetorical devices to characterize privacy. Even if an area historically

... See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
141
Id. In examining the touching of personal property in United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1984), the Court used its sui generis characterization to justify its no "search" determination as to the testing of white powder
contained in a mail package. For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 247-53.
86
486 u.s. 35, 37, 39 (1988).
S4ll Se_e Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
344
Id. at 40-41.
... Id. at 37.
,... Id. at 40-41.
147
Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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reflects privacy, as does the curtilage of a home, it may lose
this privacy under the public exposure doctrine; personal information can become public information by disclosing it to a
trusted third party; an investigative technique may be characterized as sui generis, revealing only a single piece of information; technological enhancement may be a search, depending
upon which sense it enhances; routine use may have broad and
narrow characterization under the public exposure doctrine. In
the end, the public-private dichotomy has given the Court a
means to label its conclusions. For example, an investigative
practice gathered private information (a search) or it collected
public information (no search). These shifting constructions of
privacy are consistent with postmodernist perspectives, which
rejects the idea of a grand theory to explain these search cases.
What these· decisions do offer to the Court is a variety of
rhetorical devices for constructing what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment "search" when addressing the use of emerging
technology. In Kyllo v. United States, 348 the Court used several rhetorical devices to broadly protect the home from officials'
use of a heat detection device, a nonphysically invasive investigatory practice. As the latest chapter on officials' use of technology, this sharply divided opinion readily reveals the justices
offering dramatically different interpretations of the technology
under consideration and the selective use of precedents.
IV. THE KYLLO COURT'S RHETORICAL STRATEGIES:
CHARACTERIZING TECHNOLOGY AND PRECEDENT

In Kyllo, 349 the Court held that officials' use of a thermal
imager on public streets to detect heat emissions from a home
constituted a "search" because, for five justices, this information was an "intimate detail" arising from the home's interior
and because the "general public" did not use this technology.350 The Court characterized its decision as one creating a
bright-line rule, one needed to "take ... the original meaning

5.33 u.s. 27 (2001) .
Id.
... Id. at 2046.
3<8
..9
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of the Fourth Amendment forward. "351 The majority opinion,
authored by Justice Scalia, characterized this case as controlled
by a blend of history and a fear of modern technology intruding
into the home. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice
Stevens, relied on precedent never mentioned by the majority
opinion. To reach sharply conflicting conclusions and unusual
alliances, 352 the justices in Kyllo explicitly challenged the
other's characterization of what was at issue in the case and
which precedent offered guidance. In the end, these dueling
opinions offer a panoply of rhetorical strategies for constructing
what activity does or does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
"search."
Justice Scalia implicitly admitted that the Court in its
"search" jurisprudence has at times reasoned backwards, deciding that an activity was not a "search" because other Fourth
Amendment doctrines would then apply. He stated, "(w]e have
held that visual observation is no 'search' at all-perhaps in
order to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional. "353 In
light of this admitted conclusory reasoning, Justice Scalia was
then able to move away from his prior statement that "a search
is a search"354 to the statement that the Katz standard applies when "assessing when a search is not a search. "355 Being
a Justice fond of citing dictionaries to give meaning to the
Constitution's text, 356 he realized that relying on a dictionary
for guidance would not support the Katz construction of a
"search" because of its public exposure strand. 357 In short, a
Fourth Amendment "search" is a legal construction, one created
by the justices in numerous cases, at times offering different
paradigms for a Fourth Amendment "search" and shifting con-

Id.
" Joining Justice Scalia's majority oprmon were Justices Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. ld. at 28. Joining Justice Steven's dissenting opinion were
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Id. at 41.
383
Id. at 32 .
... Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
385
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
386
See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 n.1 (1991).
387
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.l.
38t
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structions of what precedents mean in application.
Unsurprisingly, the majority and dissenting opinions offered different characterizations of many issues: (1) whether
the thermal imager detected information outside or inside the
home; (2) whether heat emissions levels are intimate or
nonintimate information; (3) whether the general public had
access to a thermal imager and whether access was relevant for
determining a Fourth Amendment "search"; (4) whether labeling the use of a thermal imager to be a "search" was protecting
our society from the slippery slope of allowing officers to use
highly sophisticated sense-enhancing equipment (that is,
whether to offer a broad or narrow ruling); (5) whether the
framers of the Constitution intended to guard against release
of this type of information; (6) whether the "public" exposure
doctrine applied; (7) whether the Court's sui generis doctrine
applied, as articulated in Place and followed in Jacobsen; 358
and (8) whether the pre-Katz "search" paradigm-with its focus
on common law trespass-still had some vitality after Katz.
When discussing these aspects of the case, the majority and
dissenting opinions at times disagreed head-on and at other
times simply offered different constructions.
In Kyllo, an officer sat in the passenger seat of his companion officer's car on a public street, both in front of and behind
Kyllo's house. 359 The officer pointed the thermal imager at the
house, which revealed that "the roof over the garage and the
side wall of [Kyllo's] home were relatively hot compared to the
rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring
homes in the triplex."360 As described by Justice Scalia, a
thermal imager is a device that converts the infrared radiation
emitted by all objects into "images based on relative
warmth-black is cool, white is hot, and shades of gray connote
relative differences."361 For Justice Scalia, the device was like
a "video camera showing heat images";362 for Justice Stevens,
068

For a discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 228-34,
238-42, 247-53.
'"" Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
360
Id.
••• Id.
s62 Id.
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the device produced "vague" images, 363 which he included in
his appendix.
Although the Justices did not dispute that the officers sat
outside the house, they did disagree as to whether the thermal
imager acquired information emanating from the house or
information that was inside the house. Justice Scalia first characterized the imager as coming inside the house; and then he
characterized heat levels as "intimate" information because,
under his bright-line construction, any information about the
house that is "safe from the prying government eyes" constitutes "intimate" information. 364 In contrast, Justice Stevens
viewed the heat levels as nonintimate information available
outside the house and thus in the public arena. 365 One way of
understanding these contrary characterizations is to look at the
precedents that the Justices cited and discussed as well as
those that they failed to cite and discuss.
To support his characterization of heat levels as
nonintimate information arising outside the house, Justice
Stevens' cited three cases never mentioned by Justice
Scalia-Place, the drug-sniffing dog case, Jacobsen, the fieldtesting of a white power case, and Greenwood, the trash
case. 366 In each of these cases, the Court held that no "search"
occurred. 367 As previously discussed, one may view both Place
and Jacobsen as cases falling within the sui generis paradigm,
a perspective not applied by Justice Scalia probably because of
his strong litany, "this is the home under surveillance," evidencing a distinction of constitutional magnitude for Justice
Scalia. Justice Stevens compared "heat waves" to "aromas"
arising "in a kitchen, or in a laboratory, or opium den."368 For
Justice Stevens, a person could not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the air in these circumstances. 369Just as in

163
164
168
168

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
For a

50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38-39.
41-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 342-46,

357.
161
168
369

Id.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Place, where a drug-detecting dog sniffed the air in an area
historically imbued with privacy, the officers used a thermal
imager to capture what was in the air. Justice Stevens also
referred to Jacobsen for the proposition that the Fourth
Amendment is not applicable when "the countervailing privacy
interest is at best trivial."370 The homeowner, according to
Justice Stevens, could have simply made sure that his home
was "well insulated."371 Justice Stevens also invoked Greenwood to compare heat loss to discarded trash bags-both are
simply waste. 372
In contrast, the precedent framing Justice Scalia's analysis
was the "search" jurisprudence decided before Katz, a case that
Justice Scalia had previously criticized as providing "a notoriously unhelpful test," a "self-indulgent test" that allowed the
justices to subJectively decide what was "reasonable privacy."373 For Scalia, history and the common law were important, but not dispositive, references in determining whether a
"search" had occurred. Scalia extensively cited and discussed
the pre-Katz trespass paradigm, yet he admitted that the Court
had "decoupled" trespass doctrines with resolution of the
Fourth Amendment "search" issue. 374 He nevertheless invoked
the old cases to support his view that the home was a "constitutionally protected area. "375 To this old doctrine, he explicitly
added a factor that could erode privacy in the home, questioning whether the technology used by the government was generally available to the public. 376 Because he characterized the
imager as not in general public use and the information as
coming from inside the home, the officials violated the
homeowner's privacy. 377
Considering whether the public used a particular type of
technology was not a new topic for the Court, but rather one

870

Id. at 44-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
m Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
872
Id. at 43-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
371
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
17
• Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-32.
175
Id. at 34 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
ns Id.
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Id. at 39.
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made as an explicit factor by Justice Scalia. Determining that
the general public did not have access to this technology, Justice Scalia declared that he was "quite confidentO" in his assessment;37s Justice Stevens, in contrast, roughly estimated
the number of thermal imagers already in the stream of commerce. 379 He also questioned the wisdom of creating "general
use" as an explicit factor, one with the potential to seriously
erode privacy each year in light of emerging technologies. 380
With different degrees of concern about emerging technologies, Justices Scalia and Stevens also wrote opinions with dramatically different breadths. Justice Scalia offered a construction of the Fourth Amendment quite protective of the home as
long as the Court characterizes the general public as not having access to the technology employed by the officials. He cited
new technologies that could destroy privacy in the home by
"seeing" through walls. 381 Justice Stevens instead offered a
new, but narrower, construction for safeguarding the home; he
distinguished between information derived from "off-the-wall'
surveillance" and "through-the-wall" surveillance. 382 For Justice Stevens, the officers in this case received information outside the house by "off-the-wall" surveillance. The integrity of
the home was not in issue because the thermal imager did not
see through the wall. Justice Stevens sought to support his
dichotomy between off- and through-the walls by citing the
view of what the Framers intended. He viewed the Framers as
chiefly concerned with the "evil" of "physical entry into the
home. "383 Because he did not view the thermal imager as involving anything inside the house, he concluded that there was
no "search."384
378

Id. at 39 n.6.
Id. at 50 n.5 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
380
Id. at 47.
381
Id. at 35-36.
82
'
Id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
sss See also id. (stating that the "interest in concealing the heat escaping from
one's house pales in significance to the 'chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed,' the 'physical entry of the house"') (quoting
United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972)).
.... Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
379
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Both Justices also invoked classic slippery slope arguments
to support their construction of what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment "search" when officials use new technology. Justice
Scalia characterized the thermal imager as being able to disclose "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her
bath. "385 This image, when combined with his reference to
technology that may someday allow a person to "see" through
walls, invokes fear that the home will no longer be private. In
contrast, Justice Stevens invoked the fear of not being able to
allow officials to use sense-enhancing equipment to "detect the
odor of deadly bacteria or chemicals for making a new type of
high explosive"386 or to protect communities from "radioactive
emissions. "387 For him, the air analysis in Place was an appropriate model for understanding the thermal imager and
emerging technology. 388 He explicitly declared "a strong public
interest" in allowing officials to detect harmful emissions without Fourth Amendment restraints in order to protect communities.389
With these contrasting characterizations of what was at
issue in Kyllo, ironically both opinions cited the important
public exposure decision of Smith v. Maryland, the pen register
case. 390 Justice Scalia briefly described it for the proposition
that governmental officials do not necessarily engage in a
"search" when they view information about the home or curtilage. 391 He then cited Ciraolo 392 and Riley,393 cases in
which officials did not conduct a "search" by flying over a home
and its curtilage to visually observe the area. 394 For Justice
Stevens, the information that officials get from a pen register
(or a thermal imager in this case) is "indirect."395 Because

3

.. ld. at 38.
ase Id. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337
Id. at 45.
388
ld. at 47-48.
389
Id. at 45.
390
See id. at 33; see also id. at 44.
391
ld. at 34.
393
476 u.s. 207 (1986).
393
488 u.s. 445 (1989).
3
"' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
'"' ld. at 44-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia did not overrule Smith, officials will still argue
that the information they gathered from the home was "exposed" to a third party. Like the general public use question,
the issue of "public exposure" is a malleable one, for one could
view the homeowner as exposing his heat to the public just as
he allegedly "exposed" his numbers to the public by allowing
the telephone company to record this information. In short, one
can easily argue that great tension exists between the analysis
in Kyllo and Smith.
In the end, the numerous contrasting characterizations in
Kyllo give the Court many options for writing future Fourth
Amendment decisions as to the government's use of technology.
The possibility of multiple constructions of what constitutes a
Fourth Amendment "search" resonates with postmodern perspectives, particularly the perception that no grand theory
exists to unify the legal arena. The Kyllo decision-perhaps like
few others-so easily allows us to view the shifting constructions of the Fourth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION

Since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791, the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly faced the question
of how to interpret the Fourth Amendment when officials use
new technology. The Court initially looked to property law
when considering whether officials had acted unlawfully in
listening to telephone conversations. 396 In 1967, the Court in
Katz explicitly declared a new paradigm for its "search" doctrine because it could no longer "ignore the vital role that the
public telephone [had] come to play in private communication."397 It instead questioned whether the use of technology
in the form of attaching an electronic bug to a public telephone
booth invaded privacy. The Court's declared shift from a property to a privacy perspective mirrored the Court's shifting characterizations of which facts matter in a case. 398 In time,
396

Id. at 31-32.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
396
See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 114, at 405 (characterizing the "Court's method" for determining a "search" to be a "malleable, ad hoc test").
397
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Fourth Amendment scholars (and some Supreme Court justices) complained that the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
simply a "mess."399
One way to comprehend this "mess" is through the lens of
postmodernism, which offers multiple perspectives on a given
issue. In short, postmodernism anticipates the interpretive
shifts, tums and "about-faces" in constructed legal doctrines. It
also questions constructed doctrinal boundaries. For example,
one may view an individual's interest in property, privacy, and
personal security as encompassed by a single large circle. The
"mess" may reflect the Court's selective highlighting (or selectively ignoring) certain aspects or issues within this broad
sphere. 400 On the other hand, the "mess" may suggest that no
"sphere" exists, except for the one constructed in a particular
case. Under this view, the Court's "search" jurisprudence appears as a (constructed) fact-bound inquiry. Although the
"mess" may reflect the Court's construction of an implicit spectrum for privacy, the Court's determination that no "search"
occurred may signify that the officials' invasion of an
individual's interest (whether in property, privacy or personal
security) was at one end of the spectrum, representing nominal
intrusions. Under this spectrum construction, the Court could
later characterize a similar act to be a "search" because of how
it characterizes additional factors, with the Court viewing the
individual's interest as on another part of the spectrum. Other
399

In his essay for this symposium issue, Professor Clancy highlighted the
malleability of the Court's "search" jurisprudence:
The Court's expectation of privacy analysis has many flaws . . . . It accordingly leaves the fluid concept of privacy to the vagaries of shifting
Court majorities, which are able to manipulate the concept to either expand or contract the meaning of the word at will. Indeed, it is difficult-if
not impossible to say exactly what the word means. Thus, while a liberal
Court substituted privacy in lieu of property analysis to expand protected
interests, a conservative Court has employed privacy analysis as a vehicle
to restrict Fourth Amendment protection.
Thomas K Clancy, Coping with Technological Change: Kyllo and the Proper Analytical Structure to Measure the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 72 Miss. L.J.
525, 533-34 (2002).
400
For example, even when the Katz Court announced a privacy focus for a
Fourth Amendment "search," it nevertheless added in a footnote that the Fourth
Amendment protects property as well as privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.4.

2002]

"SEARCH" IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

521

metaphorical constructions of the Court's "search" jurisprudence are possible because postmodernism allows us to view
the Court's "search" jurisprudence from many perspectives, as
it rejects the notion of a grand legal theory that acts as a restraint in decisionmaking.
The Katz "search" standard questioned whether a person
subjectively and reasonably expected privacy. In applying this
standard, the Court constructed several different views for
officials' using sensory-enhancing devices. For example, it declared that officials' enhancing their visual capacities did not
constitute a "search" unless the device recorded the presence of
an object in the home for a lengthy period. Contrasting this
wide breadth for technically enhanced visual surveillance was
the Court's narrow view for officials' using their hands to
"squeeze" luggage, a "search" not using technology. Tactile
observation such as "squeezing" soft-sided luggage, was a
"search" in part because the Court characterized it as more
invasive than visual surveillance.
The Court also framed the public exposure strand of Katz
differently, distinguishing between "private" information and
"public" information. To illustrate, few people have access to an
expensive map making camera; yet, for the Court, when officials flew over an industrial complex, the Court characterized
map making technology as in the public domain, undermining
an individual's expectation of privacy. In contrast, the Court
held that a "search" occurred when officials "squeezed" soft
luggage on a bus even though the traveling public routinely
handles the luggage of fellow travelers. The Court created a
narrower frame for tactile observation by questioning whether
the public routinely touches luggage in an "exploratory manner."
The Court also created a special category for drug-detecting dogs sniffing luggage; this enhancement of officials' ability
to smell drugs was not a "search." The Court did not question
whether the public routinely uses dogs to sniff the luggage of
other passengers; instead, the Court constructed a special sui
generis class for this type of sense enhancement, characterizing
the intrusion as minor, disclosing only limited information. By
constructing an analogy to this "unique" class, the Court later
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extended this sui generis approach to the field testing of drugs.
The Court's latest chapter in the book of "search" jurisprudence-Kyllo v. United States-prominently reveals the Justices'
conflicting characterizations of officials' using technology to
investigate criminal activity. With some articulated limitations,
a majority of the Court returned to the notion of a "constitutionally protected area," a prominent issue under its prior property paradigm. Five Justices held that officers conducted a
"search" when using a thermal imager to scan Kyllo's home
from a vehicle on public streets in front of and behind the
house. 401 Although the imager measured heat loss, this emission was not "waste" or trash for the majority. (The dissent, in
contrast, cited precedent that indicated that no "search" occurred when officials rummaged through opaque trash bags left
outside the curtilage.)402 Nor was the emission like the aroma
arising from luggage exposed to dogs at an airport. (The majority did not refer to cases involving the sui generis paradigm-dog
sniffs or field drug testing; the dissent did discuss this precedent.)403 To protect privacy, the majority declared that all information shielded from the public's eye in the home was intimate, subject to Fourth Amendment protection, as long as the
general public did not have access to the particular technology
used by officials. 404 The majority viewed the thermal imager
as revealing "intimate" information inside the home and characterized the public as not having access to thermal
imagers. 405 (The dissent characterized the information as arising outside the home, questioned the creation of "public access"
as an explicit factor and viewed the public as having access to
thermal imagers.)406
The Kyllo majority thus built within its new "search" jurisprudence a question with an evolving response: whether the
general public has access to the technology used by officials.
The question of public access, when considered with the Court's
401

..,.
...
...
...
406

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41.
Id. at 42 n.2 .
See id. at 47-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) .
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 42-43.
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general public exposure cases, will keep unsettled what is "public" and what is "private" information. The difficulty of drawing
analogies from precedent discussing "public" exposure still
remains, particularly when one compares the Kyllo decision
with Smith, a case cited by both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Kyllo. 401 In Smith, officers installed a pen register
at a telephone company to record the local numbers a person
dialed in his home: 408 In Smith, the Court held that the use of
the pen register was not a "search;~ in Kyllo, the use of the
thermal imager on the public streets to detect heat loss was a
"search.~ Even though the Kyllo majority cited Smith, the
two cases seem in great tension: the Smith Court characterized
the homeowner as voluntarily exposing the numbers dialed in
the privacy of his home to the "public"; the Kyllo Court characterized the homeowner as retaining a privacy interest in not
having officials learn of heat loss from this home. The Kyllo
Court admitted that the "search" jurisprudence at times reflects backwards reasoning, determining that no "search" occurred in order to avoid applying other Fourth Amendment
do.ctrines.
Even though the Kyllo majority explicitly identified public
use as a factor, the Court could nevertheless emphasize different facts in the next "search" case involving the home. 411 Alternatively the Court could construct a new paradigm, just as it
did in Katz, when it held that its prior standard failed to consider the current role of technology in society. The modern
Court may view itself as similarly situated to the Katz Court;
09

10

407

See id. at 33; see also id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
... Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
f09 Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-47 .
.,. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
411
See generally Bd. of Ed. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002) (upholding drug
testing of students' engaging in extracurricular activities). In Earls, the Court
interpreted Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), which upheld
the public schools' drug testing of athletes. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2560. Even
though Vernonia extensively described the special risks that athletes face when
they take drugs, the Earls Court stated that the distinction between athletes and
other students engaging in extracurricular activities was not "essential" to its
decision in Vernonia. Id. at 2561. Instead, the Court characterized Vernonia as
focusing on the schools' responsibility and custodial duties. Id. at 2569.
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Katz discarded Olmstead,412 a case in which the Court held
that the wiring tapping of a telephone in a home was not a
"search" because no trespass occurred. 413 The modern Court
may implicitly (or explicitly) discard the Katz standard, again
viewing changes in technology and changes in society as requiring a different paradigm for constructing a Fourth Amendment
"search." Such doctrinal changes from postmodernist perspectives do not compel us to cast aspersions on the Court, but
rather to reflect on the inherent nature of constructed legal
doctrines and their relationship to an evolving society.

m Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
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